Iran's nuclear program an assessment of the threat to the United States by Williams, David E.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2009-12
Iran's nuclear program an assessment
of the threat to the United States
Williams, David E.












IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT 








 Thesis Advisor:   Mohammed Hafez 
 Co-Advisor: Abbas Kadhim 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 i
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
December 2009 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
Iran’s Nuclear Program: An Assessment of the Threat to the United States 
6. AUTHOR(S)  David E. Williams, Jr. 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
This thesis explores the threat, if any, posed to the United States by the Iranian nuclear program.  Specifically, it 
addresses whether Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology is likely to represent a threat for homeland defense (direct use 
of nuclear weapons) or homeland security (indirect use of nuclear weapons through intermediaries).  It begins with an 
overview of the cooperation and conflict between the U.S. and Iran on a number of issues, but primarily in regard to 
nuclear technology.  Next, it addresses Iranian intentions, motivations, and rationality for developing nuclear 
technology.  The possible employment options for Iranian nuclear weapons are then reviewed and assessed in terms 
of their likelihood based on historical models of deterrence derived from the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold 
War (direct use), as well as theoretical models of Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons (indirect use).  It 
appears that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology results from a combination of security concerns, pride, prestige, and 
a desire for regional leadership.  Iran has rational motivations for pursuing nuclear technology; therefore, U.S. leaders 
should approach Iran as a rational actor in order to avert further conflict between the two states. 
 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
103 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  
Iran, nuclear weapons, deterrence, homeland defense, homeland security 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES 
 
David E. Williams, Jr. 
Major, United States Air Force 
B.A., University of Memphis, 1995 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 

























Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the threat, if any, posed to the United States by the Iranian 
nuclear program.  Specifically, it addresses whether Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology 
is likely to represent a threat for homeland defense (direct use of nuclear weapons) or 
homeland security (indirect use of nuclear weapons through intermediaries).  It begins 
with an overview of the cooperation and conflict between the U.S. and Iran on a number 
of issues, but primarily in regard to nuclear technology.  Next, it addresses Iranian 
intentions, motivations, and rationality for developing nuclear technology.  The possible 
employment options for Iranian nuclear weapons are then reviewed and assessed in terms 
of their likelihood based on historical models of deterrence derived from the U.S.-Soviet 
relationship during the Cold War (direct use), as well as theoretical models of Pakistan’s 
development of nuclear weapons (indirect use).  It appears that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear 
technology results from a combination of security concerns, pride, prestige, and a desire 
for regional leadership.  Iran has rational motivations for pursuing nuclear technology; 
therefore, U.S. leaders should approach Iran as a rational actor in order to avert further 
conflict between the two states. 
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I. THE U.S.–IRANIAN QUAGMIRE: THE INTENT OF IRAN’S 
NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
American-Iranian relations throughout the last thirty years have been mired in 
mutual mistrust and outright hostility.  This history has colored the way in which United 
States policymakers and even academics view Iran’s attempt to acquire nuclear 
capabilities. An understanding of the potential threats from the Iranian nuclear program is 
important because the U.S. is currently driving an international effort to deny Iran the 
ability to develop its nuclear program. While war with Iran is not imminent, it is not 
entirely unforeseeable either. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate dispassionately our 
foreign policy options toward Iran.  In the words of former Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi 
Livni, “every day that passes brings Iran closer to building a bomb…the world cannot 
afford a nuclear Iran.”1 
Trita Parsi notes that “years of sanctions, international pressure and threats have 
not slowed Iran’s uranium enrichment,” nor prevented the Iranians from making great 
strides in developing other aspects of its nuclear program.2  Therefore, one must consider 
if it can be deterred from its pursuit of nuclear technology in the first place.  If it does 
acquire nuclear capabilities, can it be convinced that it is not in its best interests to 
weaponize this technology?  Failing this objective, can Iran be deterred from using its 
nuclear weapons or passing them to nefarious organizations that would seek to harm the 
U.S. and its allies in the region? 
The U.S. may soon face two options: a costly, difficult, and potentially 




1 Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 267. 
2 International Crisis Group, U.S.-Iranian Engagement: The View From Tehran, Middle East Briefing 
No. 28 (June 2, 2009), 1. 
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program from reaching military applicable levels, or an acceptance of a nuclear-armed 
Iran.3  Neither of these options is appealing to the international community at this time.  
But are Iran’s nuclear efforts really a threat? 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis will look at two specific concerns in regard to Iran and its 
development of nuclear technology. First, does Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons 
represent a direct threat to the defense and security of the U.S. homeland?  From a 
homeland defense perspective, how likely are the Iranians to directly attack the U.S. with 
nuclear weapons?  Second, what is the likelihood that Iranian nuclear materiel could be 
distributed to terrorists who would seek to detonate them within the U.S., thus, impacting 
homeland security? 
In answering these questions, there are several issues that must be addressed.  
First, what are the sources of Iranian identity and the roots of the on-going U.S.-Iranian 
conflict?  This is important because it establishes not only who Iran is, but why the U.S. 
has had a hard time dealing with it on this issue, as well as sponsorship of international 
terrorism and Middle Eastern security issues in general.  A better understanding of Iran 
should provide a foundation upon which to build a better answer to the overall research 
question. 
Second, what is the status of Iran’s nuclear program and why does it want nuclear 
technology at all?  By looking at how urgent the problem of a nuclear-capable Iran is, if 
there is a problem at all, and assessing their likely motivations from both a best-case and 
a worst-case perspective, one can develop scenarios for potential Iranian use of nuclear 
technology.  This is significant because if it is pursuing an immediate or future weapons 
capability, one must ask if Iran can be deterred from directly employing such weapons or 
passing them on to terrorist organizations.  A valid concern since the U.S. has been 
targeted by terrorist organizations more than any other country in the world.4 
 
3 “Military action against Iran would be extremely risky, and even if it were to succeed the cost would 
be staggering.”  Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, 278. 
4 Bruce Hoffman, Countering the New Terrorism, Ian Lesser, ed. (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 35. 
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Third, is Iran a rational actor?  Existing theories of deterrence are based on the 
rationality of the parties involved; therefore, if Iran is not a rational actor in the classical 
sense, then existing theories may not provide an accurate framework from which to 
develop courses of action in dealing with them. There has been tremendous debate within 
the international community regarding Iran’s perceived efforts to acquire nuclear 
weapons and the possible ramifications of such a move.  While Iran has a history of 
provocative action and confrontation with the West, its acquisition of nuclear 
technologies (civil or military) might be explained in terms of normal state behavior 
based on the assumption that Iran is a rational actor and a new multi-polar world order is 
emerging in which states such as China and India will cut into America’s current share of 
international power.  This will affect Iran because it will challenge the current balance of 
power, possibly giving it a greater span of influence within the Middle East as compared 
to its Sunni rivals and Israel, all of whom have been benefactors of the current U.S. single 
super power status.  By considering both sides of the argument regarding Iranian 
rationality and recognizing the emergence of a new balance of power in the international 
community, one can develop scenarios to assess the potential threat Iranian nuclear 
weapons might pose to the U.S., assuming it successfully develops and fields such 
weapons. 
If Iran is in fact a rational actor, then its reasons for possibly wanting nuclear 
weapons capability can be understood and dealt with.  The debate about pragmatism and 
rationality in Iranian foreign policy will be explored in order to help develop this 
consideration.  From Iran’s perspective, nuclear weapons may provide protection from 
regional and global forces that exert pressure to constrain their actions.  Such pressures 
likely include Iran’s encirclement by the U.S., the Israeli nuclear weapons program, the 
Pakistani nuclear weapons program, domestic motivations, and the growing notion that to 
be a great power, a state must possess nuclear weapons.5  Iran has lived under sanctions 
and threat of attack since the theocratic regime came to power in 1979, and it may be 
logical for them to seek means of increasing their state security and international standing 
 
5 Abbas Kadhim, “The Future of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East,” The Nonproliferation Review 
Vol. 13, No. 3 (November 2006), 584–586. 
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through nuclear technology.  If Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons capabilities 
can be explained in terms of countering real or perceived threats to the state, increasing 
state prominence in the international community, and attainment of hegemonic power in 
the Middle East, then they are truly rational actors and historical and theoretical models 
can be applied to assess their potential threat to the U.S.  This is not to say that a nuclear-
armed Iran will not have other consequences: a regional arms race and a need for so-
called nuclear umbrellas covering nonstate actors are potential scenarios to consider, but 
these concerns will be left for others to address.6 
Fourth, under what circumstances would Iran use nuclear weapons if it develops 
them?  Models of deterrence exist to contain direct and indirect usage of nuclear 
weapons, but if Iranian motivations differ from those of historical actors, then previous 
understanding about the rules of nuclear brinksmanship may not apply.  This raises the 
final problem addressed in the thesis: can Iran be deterred from using nuclear weapons?  
If Iran is a rational actor legitimately pursuing a nuclear weapons program, then Cold 
War models should help us assess the potential options for deterrence against aggression 
from Iran.  A theoretical model based on what has been observed thus far with Pakistan 
can be used to evaluate the same things in the realm of state sponsorship of nuclear 
terrorism. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In exploring the history of the U.S.-Iranian relationship, one finds periods of both 
conflict and cooperation.  Iran has a long history of powerful nationalist sentiment in a 
sea of hostile regimes.  Being the center of Shi’ite Islam in a region dominated by Sunni 
elites has driven the current leadership to carve out a niche for Iran as a regional power to 
be respected in today’s globalized world.7 
 
6 Scott Sagan notes that the term “nuclear umbrella” is a misnomer: umbrella implies coverage, such as 
would be provided by an antiballistic missile system, when it actually refers to a promise of retaliation from 
a third party.  Scott Sagan, “The Case for No First Use,” Survival 51, No. 3 (June–July 2009), 168. 
7 Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Power and Paradox in the Islamic Republic (New York: Times Books, 
2006), 81. 
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Iran’s greatest source of wealth and attention in modern times stems from its 
natural resources: primarily oil and natural gas.  Ray Takeyh points out that oil price and 
availability were significant factors in U.S. and British interventions in the country after 
World War II.8  Western desires to ensure a relatively cheap and reliable flow of oil 
contributed to the overthrow of democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed 
Mossadegh and replacement of pro-Western rule in his place.  Mark Gasiorowski’s “The 
1953 Coup D’état in Iran” chronicles the events leading up to the coup, as well as its 
aftermath.  U.S. and British actions to secure access to oil and to prevent Soviet incursion 
into the Persian Gulf soured U.S.-Iranian relations to this day.9  Such intervention was 
considered unacceptable to many Iranians, especially Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who 
led the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and became Iran’s Supreme Leader until his death in 
1989.  Such a radical development was of grave concern to the West in and of itself, but 
the Iranian hostage crisis that shortly followed further soured U.S.-Iranian relations as 52 
Americans were held for 444 days.10 
The event—a defining moment for Iran and a traumatic one for the U.S. – 
capped a process that saw the overthrow of one of Washington’s closest 
regional allies and the loss of a major strategic location, at the crossroads 
of Asia and the Middle East.11 
Interestingly, the origins of Iran’s nuclear program stem from the reign of Shah 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, when U.S.-Iranian relations were very good.  The U.S. was 
initially very instrumental, often leading the way and brokering the deals, in Iranian 
acquisition of nuclear technologies until the Iranian Revolution overthrew the Shah in 
1979.12  Mustafa Kibaroglu notes that the Iranian nuclear program began in 1957 with the 
signing of the Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms (or Atoms for 
 
8 Takeyh, Hidden Iran, 90. 
9 Mark Gasiorowsli, “The 1953 Coup D’état in Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 
Vol. 19, No. 3 (August 1987), 261–286. 
10 International Crisis Group, U.S.-Iranian Engagement, 2. 
11 Ibid., 2. 
12 Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran’s Quest for 
Nuclear Power,” The Middle East Journal Vol. 60, No. 2 (Spring 2006), 207. 
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Peace Program).13  The program was an initiative of the Eisenhower administration in 
order to strengthen U.S.-Iranian technical, academic, social, and economic ties.  It 
provided for installation of U.S. equipment in Iran, the supply of technical training to 
Iranian scientists, and provisions for a supply of fuel to power a series of nuclear reactors.  
The ultimate goal of these closer ties was to create a stable Iran to maintain order in the 
Gulf, be friendly to U.S. interests in the region, and deny the Soviets influence over the 
region’s oil supply and strategic locations. 
While there is no doubt that Iran is pursuing a nuclear program, it is not certain 
that this program is intended for military purposes.  The U.S. overstated the presence of 
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction prior to its 2003 invasion, so how reliable are its 
current estimates of the Iranian program?  McCreary and Posner caution policymakers 
from overestimating the accuracy of consensus intelligence because it requires one to 
place a considerable amount of faith in the assumptions underlying speculation about 
Iranian intentions.14  Miller notes that there is an “odd and erratic mix of progress and 
failure, cooperation and collision, transparency and obduracy, concessions offered and 
concessions retracted” that frustrates international efforts to understand what Iran is 
doing and where it currently stands in regard to its pursuit of nuclear technology.15   
It should also be considered why Iran is pursuing any type of nuclear technology 
at all.  From the alarmist perspective, one need only look to the comments of politicians 
such as George W. Bush.  In January 2008 he referred to Iran as “a threat to world peace” 
for both its support of international terrorism and its alleged pursuit of nuclear 
weapons.16  According to Abbas Kadhim, however, Iranian motivations for nuclear 
technology may stem not from belligerent foreign policy ambitions, but rather from 
efforts to counter perceived pressures from potentially hostile states such as the U.S., 
 
13 Kibaroglu, “Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs,” 213. 
14 John McCreary and Richard Posner, “The Latest Intelligence Crisis,” Intelligence and National 
Security Vol. 23, No. 3 (June 2008), 371–380. 
15 Steven Miller, “Proliferation Gamesmanship: Iran and the Politics of Nuclear Confrontation,” The 
Syracuse Law Review Vol. 57, No. 551 (2006–2007), 553. 
16 “Bush Calls Iran ‘Threat to World Peace,’” CNN.Com, January 9, 2008, 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/01/09/us.iran/index.html (accessed June 11, 2009). 
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Israel, or any of its Sunni neighbors, such as nuclear-armed Pakistan.17  Such pressures 
stem from U.S. military power in the region, nuclear-armed Israel, a potentially unstable 
regime in Pakistan, domestic motivations, and international prestige.  Steven Miller 
points to four possible scenarios that could underlie Iranian nuclear efforts:18 the desire to 
immediately field nuclear weapons, the desire for a nuclear weapons option in the event 
of future conflict, a desire for international prestige, or internal motivations supporting 
technical p
Complicating an assessment of these issues is the debate about Iranian rationality.  
In the formal sense, rational action is considered to be: 
An Enlightenment tradition in which politics are distinct from religion, the 
individual is the relevant unit of analysis, and behavior is understood as 
the pursuit of self-interested goals where the actor is expected to have 
extensive knowledge of alternative means and consequences.19 
For the purposes of this thesis, rationality will be focused more specifically: a 
state that uses cost/benefit calculations over ideological considerations when making 
foreign policy decisions.  If Iran is a rational actor, then their behavior can be explained, 
predicted, and managed using existing models.  If they are not, then all of the previous 
rules related to nuclear deterrence and brinksmanship may be out of date and no longer 
apply.  But is Iran rational?  One might question the rationality of a theocratic regime in 
general, but especially one like Iran, which is well known for its fiery anti-Western and 
anti-Israeli rhetoric.  After all, inflammatory rhetoric has been attributed to current 
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad including: 
Today, [Zionists] have created a myth in the name of the Holocaust and 
consider it to be above God, religion and the prophets … If you 
[Europeans] committed this big crime, then why should the oppressed 
Palestinian nation pay the price?  You have to pay the compensation 
yourself.20 
 
17 Kadhim, “The Future of Nuclear Weapons,” 581–589. 
18 Miller, “Proliferation Gamesmanship,” 595–598. 
19 Roxanne Euben, “When Worldviews Collide: Conflicting Assumptions About Human Behavior 
Held by Rational Actor Theory and Islamic Fundamentalism,” Political Psychology Vol. 16, No. 1 (March 
1995), 157–178. 
20 Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, 264. 
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On the other hand, while writing in Foreign Affairs, Vali Nasr and Ray Takeyh 
assert that: 
Iran is not, in fact, seeking to create disorder in order to fulfill some 
scriptural promise, nor is it an expansionist power with unquenchable 
ambitions…not unlike Russia and China, Iran is a growing power seeking 
to become a pivotal state in its region.21 
Even former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani has said: 
We have made inappropriate measures or never made any measures.  And 
we have delayed making decisions.  Our Ideology is flexible.  We can 
choose expediency on the basis of Islam.22 
The results of such a review might point to the conclusion that Iran is in fact 
pursuing nuclear weapons.  Such a conclusion does not mean, however, that Iran has a 
specific intent to employ those weapons immediately against a global or regional rival, 
nor does it necessarily mean that a transfer to terrorists is imminent.  So far, only the U.S. 
has ever developed such weapons with a target in mind already: the Axis Powers during 
World War II.  If Iran does in fact have a target in mind for nuclear weapons (either 
immediately or in the event of future conflict), then they must be delivered through one 
of two general ways: direct use or indirect use.  Direct use of nuclear weapons can be 
analyzed using Graham Allison’s rational actor paradigm as described in Essence of 
Decision.  He asserts that to be rational, states must: (1) be unitary actors; (2) calculate 
the risks and benefits of actions prior to action, then choose the most beneficial course of 
action; (3) recognize the reality of an anarchical international system; and (4) pursue 
security through power.23  If they possess nuclear weapons and employ them against 
another state that also possesses nuclear weapons, then there is a reasonable expectation 
that they will face a retaliatory strike from the targeted state, therefore their nuclear 
stockpiles become a deterrent against aggression.  Is Iran willing to risk a nuclear war?  If 
so, for what reason would they do so and can they be deterred?  Jeffrey Lewis provides 
 
21 Vali Nasr and Ray Takeyh, “The Costs of Containing Iran,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 87, No. 1 
(January/February, 2008), 85–94. 
22 Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, 263. 
23 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New 
York: Longman, 1999), 27–28. 
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four points necessary for deterring Iran from nuclear attacks.24  The U.S. should ensure 
that Iran knows it will remain at a disadvantage both in conventional and nuclear arms, 
use detailed deterrent language to make U.S. response doctrines clear, reaffirm security 
commitments to allies potentially targeted by Iran, and define the terms of an acceptable 
relationship between the two countries. 
But what about providing nuclear weapons to intermediaries?  Such a question 
raises the notion of indirect use of nuclear weapons and a brief discussion on nuclear 
terrorism.  Iran has a long history of supporting terrorist organizations.  Benjamin 
Netanyahu, Alireza Jafarzadeh, Ray Takeyh, and numerous other statesmen and scholars 
all agree that Iran is one of the world’s leading state sponsors of terrorism.25  If they are 
such a willing supplier of arms, equipment, and training for nonnuclear terrorists, then 
under what circumstances would they add nuclear support to the list and can they be 
deterred from doing so?  Graham Allison points out: 
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union each knew 
that an attack against the other would elicit a retaliatory strike of 
commensurate or greater measure; but [terrorist organizations have] no 
such fear of reprisal.26 
The country that provides terrorist organizations nuclear materials should 
however have fear of reprisal.  Allison argues that a more comprehensive structure is 
necessary to add greater credibility to the deterrence aspect of preventing nuclear 
terrorism, but a rudimentary system is in existence now.27 
 
24 Jeffrey Lewis, “Assumptions Underlying the Debate on Deterring Emerging Nuclear States,” 
Deterring the Ayatollahs: Complications in Applying Cold War Strategy to Iran, Patrick Clawson and 
Michael Eisenstadt, eds. (Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2007), 20–23. 
25 Benjamin Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and 
International Terrorism (New York: The Noonday Press, 1995); Alireza Jafarzadeh, The Iran Threat: 
President Ahmadinejad and the Coming Nuclear Crisis (New York: Palgrave, 2008); and Takeyh, Hidden 
Iran. 
26 Graham Allison, “Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Terrorism,” Technology Review Vol. 
111, No. 6 (November–December 2008), 68. 
27 Ibid., 72. 
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D.  THESIS OVERVIEW 
The basic analytic approach for evaluating the question of the Iranian nuclear 
threat to the U.S. is to look at several historical and theoretical models, compare their 
similarity to the current situation, and then draw conclusions based on precedent.  The 
two primary cases that will be applied are the Cold War and the nuclear state of Pakistan. 
This thesis will look at the historical model of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship 
during the Cold War.  Both nations possessed nuclear weapons (as the U.S. does now and 
Iran may someday) and an adversarial relationship (as the U.S. and Iran have had since 
1979), yet there was never a nuclear exchange between the two.  The Cold War scenario 
illustrates the rational actor principle in international relations between the U.S. and 
U.S.S.R. and may be used to assess Iran’s likelihood of employing nuclear weapons 
directly against another state, primarily the U.S., if Iran is evaluated to actually be a 
rational actor. 
This example has several parallels between the current U.S. and Iranian situation 
today.  First, there is a history of cooperation.  The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were allies 
during World War II, just as the U.S. and Iran enjoyed positive relations under the Shah 
for a number of years.  Second, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. conflict developed over 
competitive interests and ideological visions of the world order, just as the U.S.-Iranian 
relationship soured over the level of U.S. involvement in the internal affairs of Iran and 
competing political, religious, and social ideologies.  Finally, the U.S. enjoyed a distinct 
military advantage over the U.S.S.R. until the Soviet Union developed nuclear weapons, 
just as the U.S. enjoys military advantage over Iran now.  If and when Iran successfully 
develops and fields nuclear weapons, the situation will be even more similar in that a 
mutually prohibitive level of destruction may become available to both countries, thereby 
establishing a new Cold War relationship between the two. 
The second case used to evaluate the possibility of indirect use of nuclear 
technology (passing nuclear weapons to a surrogate agent, most likely a terrorist 
organization) is Pakistan.  Pakistan is the only Muslim state to develop nuclear weapons.  
Despite being a relatively poor state with continuous periods of political instability,  
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military coups, and internal ideological fissures, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have not 
been passed to terrorist organizations for the sake of economic profit, political advantage, 
or ideological support.  
In terms of passing nuclear weapons to nonstate actors, Pakistan is the closest 
country to which Iran can be compared for several reasons.  First, Pakistan is the only 
Islamic state to develop nuclear weapons.  This is significant considering Iran is a 
theocratic Shi’ite regime, thus, creating a potential proliferation motivation for countering 
Pakistan’s Sunni bomb with a Shi’ite bomb of its own.  Second, Pakistan has long ties 
with nonstate actors such as the Afghanistan mujahedeen during the Soviet occupation 
and numerous ties between Pakistani intelligence and radical groups in Kashmir.   
Iran, like Pakistan, has long been recognized as a major supporter of terrorist 
organizations such as Hezbollah and various sectarian groups in Iraq.  Finally, both Pakistan 
and India, Pakistan’s regional rival, possess nuclear weapons and have been involved in on-
going overt and covert military conflict for an extended period.  Iran’s primary regional 
adversary is Israel: a country that possesses nuclear weapons, as well as a history of overt and 
covert conflict with Iran.  In this thesis, Pakistan is considered to be a theoretical model 
rather than a historical model because of its short time as a nuclear power and the evolving 
nature of its power structure.  Inferences about parallels between Pakistan and Iran must be 
made on the relatively short trends in Pakistan, rather than long standing, relatively stable 
political structures like the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. possessed during the Cold War. 
This thesis will begin with an overview of the history of U.S.-Iranian conflict 
focusing on the history of Iran, the rise and fall of the Shah, and early nuclear technology 
cooperation.  The next portion will evaluate the current assessment of the Iranian nuclear 
program to see how accurate current U.S. estimates appear to be.  If in fact Iran is likely 
to be pursuing nuclear weapons, it is important to consider why they are and if they can 
be deterred from employing them.  The next section seeks to address why Iran would 
want nuclear technology, both from civil and military perspectives.  Next, it will look at 
both sides of the Iranian rationality debate.  Finally, this thesis will develop and assess 
the two scenarios under which Iran could use nuclear weapons for something other than 
deterrence: direct use against another state (Cold War model) and transfer to 
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II. IRAN AND AMERICA: ROOTS OF CONFLICT 
A. HISTORY AND IDENTITY 
The current animosity between the United States of America and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran has its roots in the wealth of natural resources present in Iran, its 
strategic location along ancient trade routes and military access corridors between East 
and West, and its dominance over key terrain associated with transporting the world’s oil 
supply.  Iranian nationalism combined with Shi’ism has led to the emergence of a proud 
people with a desire for self-determination that often challenges Western ideas for the 
position and direction of the Middle East.28  By looking at the origins of the modern 
Iranian state, the turbulence of the twentieth century, and finally exploring the unique 
relationship between the U.S. and Iran in regard to the Iranian nuclear program, one can 
see the roots of conflict that have dug deep into the public perceptions and foreign 
policies of both countries.  Such a study is crucial to understanding Iran’s current nuclear 
technology motivations.  Fariborz Mokhtari reminds us that: 
When the foundation of a community’s entire existence as a nation is 
based shared historical experiences, detachment from history equates 
denouncing one’s identity.29 
B. IRANIAN NATIONALISM 
The Persian Empire, the forerunner of modern day Iran, spread art, literature, 
architecture, and religion across the Middle East and beyond.  Persian kings implemented 
measures to ensure a steady and accurate flow of information across the empire to include 
the construction of roads and the creation of a group of messengers similar to the 
American Pony Express who would carry messages from royally appointed inspectors 
back to the king.30  These roads also served at least two other purposes.  First, they were 
employed as trade routes that carried goods from all across the empire to diverse 
 
28 Takeyh, Hidden Iran, 81. 
29 Fariborz Mokhtari, “No One Will Scratch My Back: Iranian Security Perceptions in Historical 
Context,” The Middle East Journal Vol. 59, No. 2 (Spring 2005), 210. 
30 T. Walter Wallbank, et al., History and Modern Life: The World and Its Peoples (Glenview: Scott, 
Foresman and Company, 1984), 36. 
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markets eager to receive exotic goods.  Second, they ensured the ability of tax collectors 
to collect royal revenue and transport it to the king.  To help manage the tax structure that 
emerged, a system of weights and measures were developed, along with a monetary 
system based on gold and silver coins.31  This created a cosmopolitan empire that set the 
standard for the nation-states that followed, as well as creating a foundation for Iranian 
cultural identity.  Persian roads became lucrative trade routes between Europe and Asia, 
while gold and silver were replaced with oil in the modern age. 
The glory of the Persian Empire came to an end at the hand of the Greek hero and 
conqueror Alexander the Great.32  The Greco-Persian Wars stemmed from the rebellion 
of Miletus, a Greek colony that had lived under Persian rule for 50 years.33  The Greeks 
petitioned for assistance from the strong city-states of Athens and Sparta when the 
Persians moved to bring their rebellion to an end, thereby initiating a cycle of violence 
between the Hellenic League and the Persian Empire.  Despite numerical superiority, the 
Persian Empire was defeated during the Battle of Marathon in 490 B.C.34  This led to an 
ongoing conflict between Persia and Greece that brought about a back and forth series of 
military operations in which territory was gained and lost over several generations.  
Eventually, these back and forth campaigns culminated in the defeat of Persia by 
Alexander in 334 B.C.35 
Despite the eventual end of the Persian Empire, the glory of its history provides 
firm roots for the Iranian people.  In historical accounts of Cyrus, Darius, Xerxes, the 
Iranian people find their heroes.  In historical accounts of these leader’s freedom and 
tolerance, they find their morality.  In historical accounts of industrial and technical feats 
from the ancient world, they find their history.  All of these factors combine to create an 
air of Iranian nationalism founded on the glories of the Persian Empire and its time as the 
dominant world power.  This power was crushed by the Greeks: often identified as the 
 
31 Wallbank, History and Modern Life, 36. 
32 Ibid., 5. 
33 Burton Beers, World History: Patterns of Civilization (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hill, Inc., 1986), 
91. 
34 Ibid., 91. 
35 Wallbank, History and Modern Life, 97–98. 
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foundational culture on which all Western traditions are built.  The historic East versus 
West conflict is playing out again today as Iran attempts to rise in power and America 
struggles to define itself in a uni-polar world.  
Insensitivity to Iranian nationalism, instead of forcing Iranians to abandon 
their nuclear policy, runs the risk of turning it into a fiercely nationalistic 
crash program to acquire nuclear weapons at any const.36 
As Ray Takeyh points out, Iran “has always perceived itself as the rightful leader of the 
Middle East.”37  Trita Parsi summarizes it best: 
Based on Iran’s geo-strategic position, natural resources, cultural strength, 
and population size in relation to that of its neighbors, the Shah believed 
that Iran was the natural hegemon in the Persian Gulf.38 
Iranian views of themselves and their rightful place as a regional leader is currently 
leading to a challenge of U.S. hegemonic power in the Middle East and a showdown over 
its nuclear program. 
C. SHI’ISM 
Religion, long a prominent issue in and around Persia, became a refuge for many 
Iranian citizens facing oppression and injustice from their rulers during the twentieth 
century.  There was growing interest in Iran by Western powers in the early to mid-
twentieth century due to its wealth of oil and strategic location.  This interest led to 
increasing involvement in the internal affairs of Iran and the undermining of Iranian 
leadership in support of Western strategic interests.  The most influential religious figure 
in Iran, if not the Middle East as a whole, in the twentieth century is Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini.  His fiery rhetoric against the injustices of the Iranian elite, the White 
Revolution,39 and the influence of Western powers on the internal affairs of Iran raised 
 
36 Mokhtari, “No One Will Scratch My Back,” 229. 
37 Takeyh, Hidden Iran, 81. 
38 Trita Parsi, “Israel and the Origins of Iran’s Arab Option: Dissection of a Strategy Misunderstood,” 
The Middle East Journal Vol. 60, No. 3 (Summer 2006), 498. 
39 “A program of radical economic and social change that caused major unrest” implemented under 
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.  Peter Haggett, Encyclopedia of World Geography, Volume 15 
(Oxfordshire: Andromeda Oxford, 2002), 2,044. 
 16
                                                
him to prominence with disenfranchised masses in Iran who sought a better way of life 
and an escape from Iran’s drive toward Western modernity.  Khomeini was born in the 
small town of Khomein in 1902 and was vectored early on toward a career in theology.40  
His family is believed to be the direct descendents of Iman Musa al-Kazim, the seventh 
of twelve Imans dating back to the founder of Islam, the Prophet Muhammad ibn 
Abdullah.  He became the spiritual leader of the Iranian Revolution and was arrested in 
1964 for inflammatory remarks about Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and his regime’s 
alleged desire to oppose Islam and repress the religious class.41  Khomeini served eight 
months in prison, then after his release began a public campaign of criticism against the 
Shah.  This time the item of contention was the diplomatic immunity status awarded to 
U.S. military personnel and their families stationed in Iran.  Despite being exiled to 
Turkey, then Iraq, and later France, Khomeini galvanized a resistance movement that 
acted to free Iran from Western involvement and the Shah’s corruption.  Eventually this 
resistance spilled into the streets of Iran and the government was forcibly removed from 
power in the Iranian Revolution of 1979.  Khomeini became the Supreme Leader of Iran 
and established a theocratic republic form of government to rule the country that is now 
formally known as the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Shi’ism has been a central feature of Iranian life since the time of the Arab 
conquests in 637 A.D.  Shi’ism provides an ideological framework from which Iranians 
can draw strength and peace.  It is central to their identity as a theocratic state and a 
source of deep commitment inherent in their collective national identity.  As Takeyh 
points out, “as a religious minority, Shi’ites in Iran have always been suspicious and wary 
of their neighbors.”42  This suspicion has led to an insulated community that seeks to 
protect itself from unnecessary influence at the hands of those who would serve their own 
self-interests above those of the Iranian community.  When Muhammad died in 632 A.D., 
there was debate about who should lead the Muslim umma (community).  Two camps 
developed regarding the source of legitimate transfer of authority to lead the Muslims.  
 
40 James DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2007), 
286. 
41 Ibid., 287. 
42 Takeyh, Hidden Iran, 81. 
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The first camp advocated the appointment of a new leader based on prestige, power, and 
seniority in Islam.  The other camp advocated that it should be based on heredity; the 
leader should be the heir of Muhammad.  The first camp won out and appointed Abu 
Bakr (Muhammad’s close companion) over Ali (Muhammad’s close companion, cousin, 
and son in law).  This created a rift in the Muslim community that endures to this day in 
the form of the Sunni-Shi’a split.  In its most basic terms, the split involves one’s 
perception of the legitimacy of the first three Caliphs (head of the Islamic state).  Sunnis 
accept that Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman were all legitimate, where the Shi’a (or Shi’at-
u-Ali, party of Ali43) consider Ali to be the first legitimate Caliph when he came to power 
in 656 A.D.44  Through the rise and fall of numerous Muslim dynasties, the Shi’a 
continued to flourish in the land that became Iran, but they have remained politically and 
socially isolated from their Sunni neighbors.   
D. WESTERN INTERFERENCE 
Western interference in Iran begins with the build up to World War I.  British 
colonization around the globe led them to an unprecedented degree of national wealth 
and a massive span of control that dominated the world.  The jewel of the British Empire 
was India, a prize highly sought by rival colonial powers, especially Russia.  Russian 
desires to expand its empire southward to reach warm water ports and British desires to 
maintain secure routes to India led to a period of espionage, intrigue, and imperial 
maneuvering known as the Great Game.45  The British wanted to ensure strong, stable 
governments in strategic areas in order to prevent further Russian expansion.  This led to 
British support of the Qajar Shahs, an unpopular and corrupt group who ruled Persia from 
1794 until 1925.46  With the rise of the Industrial Revolution and the importance of 
maritime trade, Persia had become a depressed area.  The Qajars raised taxes and sold 
jobs in order to raise capitol to keep their empire alive, but it was not enough.  They then 
 
43 John Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path (New York: Oxford, 2005), 37. 
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46 Abbas Amanat, Pivot of the Universe: Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy 1831–
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borrowed large sums of money from Europeans and created a major debt problem for 
Persia.  This debt problem was made even worse when they sold exclusive resource 
licenses to British firms because the Persians effectively lost control of their own natural 
resources, thereby losing all means to raise capitol to repay the loans. 
Muzaffaru’d-Din Shah, facing growing internal pressures, eventually established 
a Majlis (Parliament) and developed a constitution to give the Persian people some 
degree of political power.47  Further, he formally established Twelver Shi’ism as the state 
religion and allowed the creation of five religious scholars to ensure that all legislation 
met the tenants of Sharia (Islamic law).48  Muzaffaru’d-Din Shah died shortly after these 
reforms went into place however and his successor, Mohammed Ali Shah, aided by 
British and Russian forces, destroyed the Majlis and restored the previous system of 
government.  This provoked a radical response, which led to his overthrow and exile to 
Russia. 
Russia and Britain put aside their imperial rivalry in the face of World War I to 
coerce Persia into joining the Allied powers.  The move was strictly a matter of 
practicality because of their need for Persian oil and desire to pressure the Ottoman 
Empire.  This alliance resulted in an Ottoman invasion of Persia that devastated the 
country.  At the end of World War I, the Persian people were exhausted, starved, and 
demoralized, while the government was disorganized and no longer effective.  This 
provided a golden opportunity for the British who stepped in to run Persia’s army, 
finances, and control all aspects of trade under the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919.49 
Reza Khan Mirpanj became the Commander of the Persian military and Prime 
Minister in 1921, then in 1925 capitalized on domestic unrest over the Anglo-Persian 
Agreement to remove Ahmad Shah Qajar from power.  He immediately set out to restore 
Persian glory and undo the harm done to his country by the Qajars.  He revamped the 
domestic political order of the country and established Western notions of citizenship, 
 
47 Peter Avery, Modern Iran (London: F. A. Praeger, 1965), 367. 
48 Ibid., 20. 
49 Ibid., 123. 
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strengthened domestic infrastructure, and eliminated foreign influence on the Persian 
military.  He also considered an alliance with Germany to provide an alternative to 
British and Russian influence on the country.  It was also during this period that Persia 
became known as Iran, a derivative of the word Aryan, an ethnic group from Persia’s past 
honored by the current German government.  As the Second World War began, Iranian 
leaders were under pressure to choose between the Axis and Allied powers. 
As far as the King, Reza Shah, was concerned Russia and Britain were not 
worthy of trust, the U.S. had proven unreliable to check Russian and 
British imperial ambitions, and Germany was just another foreign power 
with similar interests.50 
When he refused to join the Allies and attempted to maintain neutrality in order to escape 
the conflict, Britain and Russia invaded Iran and removed him from power, installing his 
son, Reza Shah Pahlevi, in his place. 
The Cold War began immediately after World War II.  This conflict drove most 
nations of the world to align with either the American or Soviet block.  As Amin Saikal 
points out: 
[Muslim countries] found themselves simply pawns in a global game in 
which they could play little or no role unless they attached themselves to 
one of the rival powers, or achieved the ability to play off the two powers 
in order to have a degree of autonomy in conducting their domestic and 
foreign affairs.51 
U.S.-Soviet conflict began immediately over Iran.  When Joseph Stalin refused to remove 
his troops from Iran, President Harry Truman threatened to send the U.S. military to 
remove them by force.52  This decision was eventually codified into the Truman 
Doctrine: a policy by which the U.S. would extend political, military, and economic aid 
to any democratic nation under threat from communist forces.53  This eventually drove 
the Doctrine of Containment that motivated anti-communist U.S. foreign policy efforts 
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for many years to come.54  U.S. strategic interests demanded access to oil and the denial 
of Soviet expansion into geographically strategic or resource rich areas.  Into the midst of 
this came Mohammed Mossadegh.  Ultimately he was a Persian nationalist who 
“believed that the resources of his nation should be owned and controlled by [the people 
of] his nation, not Britain.”55  Following World War II, Iran was in desperate need of 
additional state income.  The most likely source for this income was greater control over 
its domestic oil supplies.  Iranian oil however was controlled by the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company, a firm that ensured British access to Iranian oil, but provided very little in the 
way of profit for the Iranian people.  In 1951, the Iranian Majlis named Mossadegh Prime 
Minister in order to pursue nationalization of the Iranian oil industry.  There were great 
expectations for him by Iranians because of “his genuine depth of emotion for the Persian 
people, combined with his keen mind, administrative skills, and Western education.”56  
This led to Britain refusing to buy Iranian oil and seizing Iranian assets in British banks.  
Mossadegh’s popularity soared inside Iran despite increasingly despotic domestic 
measures, but his actions created great concern in the West.  This did not stop Time 
magazine from naming his as its ‘Person of the Year’ in 1951 however.57  In 1953, 
Mossadegh’s hold on power was growing tenuous due to strains with his nationalist 
partners, Iran’s declining economic situation, and an opportunistic clergy.58  Mossadegh 
then raised the possibility of Soviet intervention in the country’s affairs to restore order: 
this was perceived by the U.S. as a direct threat to its geopolitical and business interests 
in the region, and the final red line in their decision to take direct action.59  To eliminate 
this perceived threat, the U.S. and Britain conspired to undermine his position in Iran 
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with ‘Operation Bedamn.’60  This operation called for a combination of guerilla warfare, 
espionage, and prewar coordination efforts to undermine pro-Soviet elements within Iran 
and the surrounding areas.  When these actions failed to produce the desired results in a 
timely manner, and the Truman Administration (who had objected to earlier British plans 
for a coup d’état in Iran) was replaced by the Eisenhower Administration, a more 
aggressive strategy to remove him from power and restore Shah Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi to full power was put into action: ‘Operation Ajax.’61  This culminated in the 
removal of the “last popular, democratically oriented government to hold office in 
Iran.”62 
Western intervention in Iran has always been at the expense of the Iranian people.  
Whether it was their strategic location, valuable natural resources, or using them as 
cannon fodder in European wars, the Iranian people have been subject to the power plays 
of the great powers of the day.  After experiencing such treatment, Iranian nationalism 
and Shi’ism become much more than abstract concepts: they become underlying 
foundations on which desires to escape Western influence and rise to great power status 
rest.  As Ray Takeyh states: 
To this day, many Iranians believe that an opportunity to forge a new independent 
and nonaligned foreign policy, employ natural resources for national development, and 
build democracy were all lost due to the machinations of a rapacious superpower.63 
Kristen Monroe and Lina Kreidie find three things that shape political identity 
that are especially relevant to Iran: canonical expectations, worldview, and view of self.64  
When applied at the societal level, their work highlights Iran’s perception that Western 
interference is the norm; thus, they are presented with a fundamental choice: resistance or 
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acceptance.  Most Iranians operate with a worldview that is different that those 
commonly held in the West, therefore their history creates a view of their nation that 
differs from that of America.  These differing views have set Iran and the U.S. on a 
collision course over the future of the Iranian nuclear program. 
E. NUCLEAR COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 
It was after “Operation Ajax” and the Shah reasserted his power over Iran that the 
U.S. began a bold new era of cooperation with Iran.  This cooperation involved technical 
and economic development, military cooperation and support, as well as the development 
of nuclear technologies.  This section will focus primarily on the nuclear aspect of this 
cooperation, but it should be noted that the U.S. eventually expressed a vested interest in 
Iran becoming the “Defender of the Gulf” in order to free up American power 
elsewhere.65 
The Iranian nuclear program began in 1957 with the signing of the Agreement for 
Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms (or Atoms for Peace Program).66  The 
program was an initiative of the Eisenhower administration in order to strengthen U.S.-
Iranian technical, academic, social, and economic ties.  The program provided for 
installation of U.S. equipment in Iran, the supply of technical training to Iranian 
scientists, and provisions for a supply of fuel to power a series of nuclear reactors.  The 
ultimate goal of these closer ties was to create a stable Iran to maintain order in the Gulf, 
be friendly to U.S. interests in the region, and deny the Soviets influence over the 
region’s oil supply and strategic locations.  Iran signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty in 1968, thus, agreeing not to pursue nuclear weapons in exchange for assistance 
in developing and maintaining a peaceful nuclear energy program.  This program was 
expanded under President Gerald Ford.  His administration brokered a deal that offered 
Iran the opportunity to acquire a reprocessing facility, thereby providing the Shah with 
the ability to develop a complete nuclear fuel cycle and a means for produce fuel for 
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nuclear weapons.67  In 1975, this program was expanded under the oversight of Henry 
Kissinger and Hushang Ansari to include the acquisition of an additional eight reactors.  
Such ties extended to Europe as well, with Germany and France also making billions of 
dollars for the sale of reactors, fuel, and the training of scientists. 
The period from 1957 until 1979 represent the closest ties between Iran and the 
West in history, yet the Shah’s domestic support waned as he focused on transforming 
Iran into a modern, Western country often at the expense of his people.  The external 
impression of the Shah was that he was firmly in control of his country and secure in his 
power, but the internal impression was much different.  The Shah used Western military 
and intelligence training and equipment to keep his people firmly under his thumb and 
secure his power.  This leant credibility to Ayatollah Khomeini and increased his 
following, which eventually culminated in the Islamic Revolution. 
After the Islamic Revolution, all vestiges of Western support for Iran’s nuclear 
program fell away.  This was due to both Western desires to distance themselves from the 
theocratic regime that rose to power, as well as Ayatollah Khomeini’s desire to eliminate 
all Western influence within Iran, including nuclear technology. 
The anti-American trajectory of the Iranian revolution reflects several 
complementary dynamics: the regime’s desire to find its place between the 
then-competing superpowers; the reflection of two centuries of 
humiliation at the hands of the West, most lately and visibly the U.S.; and 
the utility of a foreign scapegoat to explain the nation’s enduring 
difficulties.68 
Many of the Iranian nuclear scientists were arrested, exiled, or killed, leaving the 
program in shambles.  It was not until the Iran-Iraq War that Ayatollah Khomeini began 
to rethink this decision.69  Hoping to defeat Iraq and deter future aggression, Iranian 
President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani began to court China for nuclear technical and 
operational support.  Later, Iran also approached Pakistan, Argentina, Spain, 
Czechoslovakia, and Russia, thus, gaining varying degrees of international support in 
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restarting its nuclear program.70  Iranian progress in this area appears to be moving along 
at an impressive rate.  In 2002, it was revealed that Iran’s nuclear program was much 
more advanced than had been originally disclosed to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA).71  This drove international concern about the extent and intent of the 
Iranian nuclear program.  The West asserts that Iran is attempting to acquire nuclear 
weapons in order to use them against their neighbors or to pass them to terrorists, while 
Iran asserts that its nuclear program is only for peaceful, civilian use. 
Whatever the real purpose, the U.S. has said: 
The Iranian regime is defying the world with its nuclear ambitions, and the 
nations of the world must not permit the Iranian regime to gain nuclear 
weapons.”72 
Meanwhile, the Keyhan (a conservative Iranian newspaper) urges the Iranian regime “to 
plan for acquiring the knowledge and ability to make nuclear weapons, which is 
necessary in preparation for the next phase in the future battlefield.”73  From their 
perspective, conflict with the U.S. is inevitable; therefore the regime must prepare for its 
defense through the most effective means available: nuclear weapons.  In the end, the 
West must remember two important things: it was the U.S. that assisted Iran begin its 
march toward nuclear power in the beginning and it was the West that stood by silently 
while Iraq, Iran’s replacement as the Guardian of the Gulf following the Iranian 
Revolution, employed chemical weapons against Iran (chemical weapons obtained with 
cooperation from the West).74  Ultimately, according to Gregory Giles, the inaction of 
Western powers inspired Iran to act “in accordance with realist expectations” and adopt a 
“strategy of self-help” that may include nuclear weapons.75 
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F. IRAN’S NATIONAL IDENTITY 
By reviewing the origins of the modern Iranian state, the turbulence of the 
twentieth century, and exploring the unique relationship between the U.S. and Iran in 
regard to the Iranian nuclear program, one can see the roots of conflict that have dug deep 
into the public perception and foreign policy of both countries.  In 2000, then Secretary 
of State Madeleine Albright said of Mossadegh’s removal: 
The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for 
strategic reasons; but the coup was clearly a setback for Iran’s political 
development.  And it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to 
resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs.76 
Would things have been different if the U.S. had not chosen this course of action? 
Although it is impossible to give a definitive answer to this question, the 
evidence presented here suggests that the coup could not have occurred at 
the time and in the manner it did without considerable U.S. assistance.  
U.S. officials planned and directed the coup, and financed it with at least 
$60,000.77 
As noted by Fariborz Mokhtari, “Iranians support a policy of deterrence because 
their perception of Iran’s security is colored by historical experience.”78  There are three 
conclusions that need to be stressed to properly set the stage for the following chapters.  
First, Iran’s Persian history has led to the notion among Iranians that Iran is more than a 
mere country: it is a civilization that deserves both respect from the international 
community and acknowledgement of its place as a regional power.  Second, Iran’s Shi’ite 
heritage has created a threat to its security from the Sunni regimes that surround it: 
nuclear power would be a hedge against aggression from both regional and international 
powers.  Finally, the history of Western influence in Iran has contributed to the current 
interest in nuclear power by both the Iran’s elite and its masses as a deterrent force to 
deter any future interference. 
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III. COMPETING PERSPECTIVES: 
U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND IRANIAN MOTIVATIONS 
A. WHAT IS IRAN UP TO? 
There is a shadow hanging over the United States’ pronouncements regarding the 
Iranian nuclear program.  Bogged in controversy over mistakes made in the run up to the 
invasion of Iraq, inflamed by Iranian rhetoric, and frustrated by allied doubt, the U.S. has 
worked to understand where Iran stands, and where it intends to go with its nuclear 
ambitions.  In the midst of the political bantering back and forth about the status and 
purpose of the program lie fundamental questions regarding the validity of and 
underlying motivations behind U.S. assessments over Iran as well: is the U.S. looking for 
another fight?  Will the U.S. let Iran acquire nuclear weapons, a situation potentially 
threatening U.S. regional allies such as Israel?  Such threats are at the heart of Iran’s 
current military build-up and doctrinal shift according to Steven Ward. 
If [Iran] can fulfill its maturing approach to doctrine, Iran will be better 
positioned to threaten U.S. interests despite many military shortcomings.  
And, should conflict come, Iran could be much better prepared than recent 
American adversaries to upset seriously U.S. operations through surprise, 
unconventional tactics, and worldwide retaliatory responses.79 
This section examines the current situation in order to develop an objective 
understanding of what is known about Iran’s nuclear program from a historical and 
contemporary perspective, while exploring the back and forth between critics and 
supporters of the most current National Intelligence Estimate on Iran conducted in 2007.  
In order to accomplish this, this thesis will evaluate support and opposition for U.S. 
intelligence estimates of Iran, and will try to see the issue from the Iranian perspective.  
Whenever trying to distinguish a state’s intent by looking at its capability, there is room 
for misinterpretation, but by eliminating emotional and political biases in favor of a 
careful review of the evidence, one can obtain an objective understanding from which 
informed predictions can be made. 
 
79 Steven Ward, “The Continuing Evolution of Iran’s Military Doctrine,” The Middle East Journal Vol. 
59, No. 4 (Autumn 2005), 559–560. 
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B. U.S. ESTIMATES 
The U.S. overstated the presence and threat of Iraqi WMD prior to its 2003 
invasion, so how reliable are its current estimates of the Iranian program?  To make an 
assessment, one should understand the process by which such estimates are made.  Sarah 
Kreps provides the necessary overview.80  First, intelligence estimates must be requested 
by senior leadership in the Executive Branch, Legislative Branch, or the Department of 
Defense.  Once requested, they are authorized by the Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI) and the National Intelligence Council (NIC), who then establishes the framework 
that will define the scope of the finished document, and creates an initial draft.  This draft 
is then sent out across the Intelligence Community (IC) for “coordination, comment, and 
critique.”81  The document is then reviewed by interagency working groups.  These 
groups thoroughly review the document in order to ensure accuracy and wording, as well 
as to reach a multi-agency consensus of the material.  Minor disagreements are tolerated, 
but noted in footnotes.  It is then sent out for a review process similar to the academic 
publishing peer review process.  Feedback from this review results in a document that is 
presented to the National Intelligence Board (NIB).  The NIB is made up of senior 
intelligence officials from the U.S. Government and chaired by the DNI.  Once finalized, 
the report is provided to the requestor for appropriate action.  Kreps points out that “since 
they are based on incomplete information, NIEs tend to hedge against the uncertainty by 
including qualifying or probabilistic language.”82 
Qualifying or probabilistic language is at the heart of the current flap over 
intelligence on the Iranian nuclear program.  The 2005 NIE asserted that Iran was 
“determined” to acquire nuclear weapons, while the 2007 NIE has softened that 
assessment to the statement “we do not know whether [Iran] currently intends to develop 
nuclear weapons.”83  Further, the 2007 NIE also asserts with “high confidence that in fall 
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2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program:” a notion completely contradictory to 
the 2005 assessment.84  Supporters cite that the current assessment provides application 
of lessons learned from Iraq in that it allows for “red teaming” and incorporation of new 
intelligence that contradicts preconceived notions, while critics blast the report for its 
rapid reversal of all previous data and indications.  Supporters cite red teaming and 
incorporation of new intelligence as two factors directly resulting from U.S. intelligence 
lessons learned following the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  U.S. intelligence failures in Iraq 
have often been blamed on politics: that is to say that the Bush administration was 
looking for an excuse to attack Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction 
provided the required justification.85  In such an environment, according to John 
McCreary and Richard Posner, preconceptions are likely to “exert a subtle, invisible, 
unacknowledged, indeed unconscious, but strong gravitational pull” toward 
predetermined conclusions.86  The assertion of political motivations, institutional bias, or 
incompetence likely drove the IC to be much more cautious with the 2007 assessment on 
Iran. 
The NIE that laid the groundwork for U.S. actions in Iraq was entitled “Iraq’s 
Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction.”87  It was released in 2002 and 
was originally classified “Top Secret,” but an unclassified version was released in April 
2004.  This document outlined several key judgments regarding Saddam Hussein’s WMD 
program concluding with “high confidence” that “Iraq is continuing, and in some areas 
expanding, its chemical biological, nuclear and missile programs contrary to U.N. 
resolutions” and “[the U.S.] is not detecting portions of these weapons programs.”88   Of 
course, once the invasion was complete, no WMD was found in Iraq.  So what went 
wrong? 
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The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 
Weapons of Mass Destruction was a panel of experts established by Executive Order 
13328 in order to evaluate what exactly went wrong with the intelligence on Iraq.89  
Their findings concluded that the IC “grossly erred” in its assessments of Iraq’s extent 
and intent of WMD.  There are six key points to highlight from the report for purposes of 
the current discussion.  First, the panel was frustrated by its inability to get full access to 
how policy makers used the intelligence they received on Iraq.  Second, they criticized 
U.S. intelligence for relying on an informant, code named “Curveball” and later 
identified as Rafid Ahmed Alwan, who was never interviewed directly by U.S. 
intelligence officers.  Curveball was handled exclusively by German agents prior to the 
2003 invasion.90  Third, some equipment thought to be for nuclear weapons was in fact 
used for other purposes.  An example of this is aluminum rods believed to be procured 
for enrichment activities were actually used for conventional munitions.  Fourth, some of 
the most alarming intelligence leading up the invasion, Iraqi efforts to procure 
yellowcake, stemmed from “transparently forged documents.”91  These documents 
contained numerous examples of forgeries, misspelled words, and incorrect titles that 
should have been an indication of their lack of validity.  Fifth, other defectors who were 
originally considered credible turned out to be providing inaccurate data.  Finally, despite 
wide-spread speculation, the panel did not find concrete evidence of coercion by 
administration officials to manipulate
Henry Kissinger, on the opposing side of the 2007 Iran NIE argument, states that 
the report “blurred the lines between estimates and conjecture, policy and intelligence.”92  
While writing in The Backgrounder, James Philips outlines the main criticisms of the 
NIE.93  First, the estimate is more cautious than those of the International Atomic Energy 
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Agency (IAEA).  John Bolton, former Under Secretary of State, says that “when the 
IAEA is tougher than our analysts, you can bet the farm that someone is pursuing a 
policy agenda.”94  Second, the document delves into policy formulation rather than 
intelligence analysis.  This is the case because the NIE assigns a greater importance to 
international pressures than military force in coercing Iran to pursue the U.S.’ desired 
course of action, thereby appearing to push a particular course of action for decision 
makers.  Third, the document implies that the weaponization of a warhead is the most 
important aspect of a covert nuclear program.  Opponents charge that bomb designs are 
not nearly as complex as other aspects of the overall process.  Bomb designers can 
employ computer programs to assess the viability of the designs with such accuracy that 
tests of the actual device are not always necessary.  With Iran’s connections to A. Q. 
Khan’s network of nuclear proliferation, research and development on warhead designs 
may not even be necessary since the designs for such components were available for sale.  
Fourth, the NIE does not recognize the importance of Iran’s civil uranium enrichment 
program.95  Iran currently has only one working reactor: Bushehr.  Nuclear fuel for this 
reactor is provided by Russia and there are no plans for this to change, so why would Iran 
need a complete fuel cycle, especially one with the capacity that they are currently 
pursuing?  Fifth, the NIE fails to recognize the possibility of a disinformation campaign 
on the part of Iran.  Much of what is known about Iran’s program was obtained via a 
laptop computer turned over to U.S. officials by a defector, information from dissident 
groups with contacts inside Iran, and electronic intercepts.  These techniques are subject 
to manipulation by the targeted state as was the case of U.S. and Soviet espionage efforts 
during the Cold War.  Also, as in the case of defectors and informants from Iraq, the 
information received may be subject to inaccuracies based on prejudices of the informant 
(e.g., to punish one’s former regime for some perceived injustice) or a desire to please 
foreign intelligence analysts (e.g., in the hopes of obtaining sanctuary or special 
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privileges for the information provided).  Sixth, the document looks at the nuclear 
program in isolation from other programs, such as Iran’s ballistic missile program.  Since 
the nuclear warheads require a delivery system of some sort, analysts must look at 
tertiary or supporting programs to develop a complete picture of a state’s intent.  Finally, 
the NIE downplays the importance of U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq 
in influencing Iran to slow or stop work on its nuclear program, if in fact it has slowed or 
stopped.  Ultimately, this report has the potential to lift pressure on Iran because it 
proposes that they are not in fact pursuing a weapons program: an assertion flatly rejected 
by many U.S. allies.  An anonymous British official quoted by Phillips states that the 
Iranians could have easily duped intelligence officers by putting out false or controlled 
information to confuse efforts, especially following U.S. actions in Iraq.  Further, an 
Israeli analyst (also anonymous) pointed to U.S. failures in detecting Syria’s nuclear 
efforts: 
The Syrians were working on their nuclear project for seven years, and we 
discovered it only recently.  The Americans didn’t know about it at all.  So 
how can we be sure about Iran?96 
Despite all of the circumstantial evidence supporting a military aspect to the 
Iranian nuclear program and the criticisms of the current NIE, there remains, however, no 
clear evidence of a specific weapons program.97  This fact underpins most rhetoric 
supporting restraint against Iran right now and is completely in line with the 2007 NIE’s 
assessment.  For its part, Iran has claimed to have provided all required information and 
support required by the IAEA.  Additionally, they have explained away all previous 
breaches as either oversights, mistakes, or simply as actions they took clandestinely 
because they could not rely on the international community to openly support them.  
They have accurately pointed out that the course of action they selected was the only one 
available to them since they were: 
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Deprived of full access to international nuclear commerce and vulnerable 
to American disruptions of its deals, [therefore] Iran could not draw upon 
or rely on legitimate markets in nuclear technology.98 
Precedents of such errors and lack of support are not uncommon.  South Korea was 
discovered to have committed breaches similar to Iran’s, yet there was little if any 
international attention or condemnation for their actions.  This reinforces Iranian 
assertions that it is being unfairly targeted by the U.S.: actions they have referred to as 
“political bullying.”99  Much of the assertions made by the U.S. against Iran in regard to 
their nuclear ambitions have been unquestioned.  McCreary and Posner caution policy 
makers from overestimating the accuracy of consensus intelligence because it requires 
one to place a considerable amount of faith in the assumptions underlying speculation 
about Iranian intentions and decisions.100  “There is a critical difference,” they say, 
“between intelligence concerning a physical event or activity, on the one hand, and 
intelligence concerning a decision on the other.”101   
Without a clear understanding of where Iran stands, the U.S. risks repeating the 
Iraq WMD fiasco all over again.  Miller suggests that there are four scenarios that are 
consistent with the current evidence against Iran, none of which should invite a U.S. 
invasion akin to Iraq.102  First, Iran is in fact seeking nuclear weapons: a scenario looked 
at more closely in the next section.  Second, Iran had a nuclear weapons program in 
development to counter Saddam Hussein’s program, but gave it up after the end of the 
Iran-Iraq War.  Third, Iran is developing a nuclear weapons option that may be fast 
tracked under specific circumstances.  This position is favored by the Director General of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, who states that Iran’s 
mastery of a complete nuclear fuel cycle and the option of fielding a nuclear weapon is a 
deterrent in and of itself.103  Finally, Iran is only pursuing a civil nuclear power program.  
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All but the first of these scenarios would fit easily with the findings of the 2007 NIE.  In 
trying to interpret which scenario is most likely, Miller notes that it is difficult to 
establish where Iran is currently at due to: 
An odd and erratic mix of progress and failure, cooperation and collision, 
transparency and obduracy, concessions offered and concessions retracted 
that complicate the entire process of understanding where exactly Iran is 
in the process of nuclear weapons development.104 
Despite the application of some of the lessons learned from the intelligence failure 
leading up to the invasion of Iraq, there still appears to be underlying problems with the 
current intelligence assessment on Iran.  The majority of what the U.S. claims to know is 
based on informants, foreign governments hostile to Iran, and circumstantial evidence: 
similar or identical problems identified in light of the Iraq WMD mistake.  While most of 
the evidence pointing toward a nuclear weapons program in Iran is circumstantial, there 
is however a lot of it.  An amount so overwhelming, in fact, that it is not likely that Iran is 
simply pursuing nuclear technology solely for peaceful uses as it has repeatedly claimed.  
The key aspects that underpin this statement are Iran’s program of tertiary research and 
development, as well as the logic of developing a nuclear deterrent.  From the research 
and development side, one must ask why Iran would require more sophisticated ballistic 
missiles without the armaments necessary to maximize their usage.  Conventional 
ballistic missiles do not have the accuracy or payload to make them worthwhile to 
pursue, nor would there be a need for Iran to pursue nuclear-capable missile cones 
without intent to field them with nuclear warheads.  It is also interesting to note that just 
as America and its Western allies provided Iraq with weapons during the 1980s, Iran is 
acquiring much of its technology from Western nations, such as the U.S., Germany, and 
Russia.  In fact, Iran was identified in 2008 by 2008 U.S. Department of Justice as the top 
enforcement priority for illegal export control enforcement.105  As pointed out by 
Phillips, “it makes little military sense to invest so heavily in such missile programs 
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 aspect, the logic of nuclear deterrence, will be 
addressed in the following two sections.  
C. 
eith Payne notes that deterring Iran will not be as 
easy de
t nal and internal value of nuclear weapons are 
invasion from Europe and a U.S. 
monop
                                                
unless the warheads are armed with nuclear weapons.”106  Such missiles provide Iran 
with a stand- 
off capability ideally suited for a strategic nuclear deterrence in line with its regional and 
global security concerns.  The second key
IRAN’S PERSPECTIVE 
After reviewing the assessments of Iran’s nuclear program, it appears that Iran is 
likely pursuing nuclear weapons.  K
terring the Soviets because: 
A close examination of Iranian decision making suggests that deterring 
Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapons program is going to be extremely 
difficult because the ex er
high for the leadership.107 
Such a conclusion, however, does not mean it is impossible.  There are several issues that 
underlie Iranian nuclear ambitions, as well as several parallels between the current U.S.-
Iranian situation and the U.S.-Soviet Cold War relationship.  It is very likely that Iran is 
pursuing nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence against what it perceives as a hostile 
U.S. foreign policy, to counter Israeli nuclear dominance in the Middle East, as a 
countermeasure to Pakistan’s nuclear program in the event of heightened tensions, and as 
a means of reacquiring the previous glory of the Persian Empire, just as the Soviets 
pursued nuclear weapons in order to deter another 
oly on post-World War II international power. 
So far this thesis has shown the roots of the U.S.–Iranian conflict, discussed the 
history of the Iranian nuclear program, and looked at U.S. intelligence estimates 
regarding the Iranian nuclear program.  The question to ask now is why would Iran want 
nuclear weapons even if it has no intention of immediately employing them?  By 
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ri, “from the Iranian vantage point, the case for a nuclear deterrent is 
compel
e International Crisis 
Group quotes an unnamed Iranian analyst who summed it up best: 
                                                
evaluating Iran’s rationale for wanting nuclear capabilities from a rational actor 
perspective, one can understand the why such capability would be sought even if never 
employed.  From Iran’s perspective, nuclear weapons would provide protection from 
regional and global forces that constantly exert pressure and constrain their actions.108  
Such pressures include Iran’s encirclement by the U.S., the Israeli nuclear weapons 
program, the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, and the growing notion that to be a 
great power, a state must possess nuclear weapons.  Iran has lived under sanctions and 
threat of attack since the theocratic regime came to power in 1979 and it is logical for 
them to seek a means of increasing their state security and international standing through 
techniques that have proven effective for other modern states.  The most effective of such 
techniques has been the development and fielding of nuclear weapons.  As observed by 
Fariborz Mokhta
ling.”109 
Feroz Hassan Khan points out that “insecure states that lack firm security 
commitments from allies and that fear for their survival are essentially ‘orphans’ in a 
nuclear-armed world.”110  The U.S. and Iran have a long history of animosity toward one 
another and there is little doubt that Iran perceives the U.S. as a significant and 
immediate threat.  U.S. forces have toppled governments on two of its borders and 
worked to replace them with anti-Iranian regimes.  This occurred shortly after it 
supported Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War with arms and 
equipment, including chemical weapons that were used against Iran and resulted in an 
estimated 34,000 casualties.111  Additionally, the U.S. has made no secret of its desire to 
see the theocratic regime toppled and replaced with a more pro-Western one.  U.S. threats 
along these lines are no small matter in the post 9/11 world.  Th
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ile, the U.S. is seeking to negotiate with North Korea.  What 
conclusion do you think the Iranian regime would have drawn from 
ate must possess nuclear weapons, and one sees the motivation for Iran to pursue  
                                                
 
Of all of the justifications the [Iranian] regime could invoke to pursue its 
nuclear program, those provided by the Americans were the most effective 
by far.  Aside from Iran, two countries belonged to Bush’s “axis of evil”: 
Iraq and North Korea.  The former did not posses a nuclear weapon; the 
latter did.  Iraq was invaded, its regime overthrown, its territory occupied.  
Meanwh
this?112 
Also, the potential threat posed by nuclear-armed neighbors not friendly to Iran 
presents a concern to the ruling clerics.  Armed with nuclear weapons, Israel is the 
dominant military power in the Middle East.  As the dominant power, Israel is often 
presented as an arrogant, bullying offspring of the U.S.  Deep animosity remains in the 
region due to Israeli treatment of Palestinians, yet there is little that any state in the region 
can do to compel Israel to cease what they see as aggressive and hostile acts toward their 
Muslim neighbors.  There is also concern that the Pakistani nuclear weapons program 
could someday become a threat to Iran.  Pakistan is not a stable state politically: the 
Pakistani military has played a dominant role in the political process through coups with 
military officers serving seizing power and ruling roughly 23 out of its 62 years of 
existence.  Under the current circumstances, there is an increasing possibility that 
Wahhabi fundamentalist groups will come to power in this nuclear armed state through 
insurgency or a change in political climate.  If this were to happen, Iran likely perceives 
that there would be a direct nuclear threat to Shi’a Islam from a fundamentalist Sunni 
regime: a situation that Iran, the champions of Shi’a Islam, would feel compelled to 
counter with a Shi’a nuclear bomb capability.  A nuclear-armed Iran would not provide 
Iran with supremacy in the region; rather it would provide Iran a nuclear deterrent that 
would counterbalance Israel and Pakistan, thus, providing for a level of security Iran 
could not otherwise achieve.113  Add to this the growing notion that to be a great power, a 
st
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hapter II, Iran has a long history of both Persian 
nationalism and Shi’a Islamic revolutionary spirit: the two factors that have combined to 
 worldviews differ 
from th
 the Muslim masses by presenting Iran as the champion of 
Islam a ormer 
Foreign
se, Iran is isolated.  If it is an Islamic 
discourse, then Iran is in a leading position.  And always with the view of 
        
 
 
nuclear weapons.  As discussed in C
create their current national identity. 
D. IRANIAN RATIONALITY 
One might question the rationality of any theocratic regime, especially one 
highlighted for its support of international terrorism and status as a member of the “Axis 
of Evil.”  While a full debate of this issue is too long to address in this forum and will 
draw very strong opinions from both sides of the argument, it is sufficient to note that 
there are numerous examples of Iranian pragmatism in domestic and foreign policy that 
trump religious ideology.  As briefly touched on in Chapter II, Iran has a worldview that 
differs from the West.  Worldviews create the foundation upon which rationality is based 
and decisions are made.  In short, rationality is relative because the costs/benefits of a 
given action are established based on one’s worldview.  Since Iranian
ose of Western worldviews, their actions may appear less rational on the surface, 
but when analyzed from an Iranian perspective, they become clear.114 
The presence of such examples supports the notion that while Iran is ideologically 
committed to Shi’ite Islam and Islamic revolutionary rhetoric, they are also rational 
actors and will look at policy in terms of cost/benefit analysis.  Such provocative 
statements from Iran serve to inflame the Arab street in order to weaken Sunni regimes 
hostile to Iran, while rallying
gainst Zionism and Western interference.  Shlomo Ben-Ami, Israel’s f
 Minister, says: 
In my view [rallying the Arab street] remains, even with this nuclear thing, 
the main purpose of Ahmadinejad’s incendiary rhetoric.  If the discourse 
in the Middle East is n Arab discour
                                         
114 Monroe and Kreidie, “The Perspective of Islamic Fundamentalists,” 19–43. 
 39
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they ac ies for dealing 
with a nuclear armed Iran. 
ology and industrial capacity, could not over come the 
above security challenges.  A credible nuclear deterrence with a reliable 
f great power status, 
counter
despite the rhetoric often portrayed to international audiences.  Israeli television journalist 
                                                
protecting Iran and the Iranian revolution, which is why they tried all the 
time to oppose the peace process.115 
This is critical when attemp
quire nuclear weapons, as well as in developing deterrence strateg
Writing in The Middle East Journal, Fariborz Mokhtari notes that: 
Without allies or surrounding protective oceans, Iran’s security must 
therefore be based on deterrence … Iran’s deterrence must be self-
generate and self-reliant.  A conventional force based on domestic 
resources, techn
missile technology could, and is relatively inexpensive and probably 
within reach.116 
The area surrounding Iran is an inherently unstable region.  With troubled states such as 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the on-going Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the uni-polar 
status of the U.S., Iran is in a unique position to obtain a greater place not only on the 
regional stage, but on the world stage as well.  Their foreign policy decisions are likely to 
follow a course of action designed to increase their influence and status, rather than to 
threaten greater instability and increased division between themselves and the regional 
and international community.  Henry Kissinger reminds us that “nations have pursued 
self-interest more frequently than high-minded principle.”117  While Iran is a theocratic 
state with a deeply ingrained Shi’ite perspective, it is also a modern nation-state that must 
calculate its actions carefully or fade into oblivion.  Iran is therefore more likely 
motivated by such issues as national pride and prestige, pursuit o
acting perceived threats to national security, and internal desires by political and 
social elites than it is by religious zeal or mischievous intentions.118 
Many Israelis even acknowledge the rationality of Iranian foreign policy decisions 
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Ehud Yaari notes “people [in Israel] respect the Iranians and the Iranian regime.  They 
take them as very serious, calculating players.”119  Additionally, Ephraim Halevi, former 
Director of Mossad and head of the Israeli National Security Council, asserts that “I don’t 
think they are irrational, I think they are very rational … to label them as irrational is 
escaping from reality and it gives you kind of an escape clause.”120  
 in the Israel-Iran rivalry is captured by Trita Parsi when he says: 
Israel and Iran’s fear that the creation of a new order in the region would 
benefit the other is acute precise
geopolitical basis for its frail order.121 
Parsi even goes so far as to cite “several Israeli decision-makers” who st
] Labor Party exaggerated the Iranian threat for political reasons.”122 
In his article “Id
ani points out that: 
The tensions between religious ideology and pragmatism has persisted 
throughout Iranian history…[yet] the dynamic processes of cultural 
maturation seem to be shifting the balance of influence increasingly away 
from religious ideology toward pragmatic calculation of the t
interest in making and implementation of foreign policy decisions.123 
One such example of the pragmatism of the Iranian government that illustrates their 
rationality in foreign affairs is the purchase of arms from the U.S. and Israel.  The 
transaction took place during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988 and was conducted via 
intermediaries in order to bolster Iranian forces while providing assistance to the U.S. and 
Israel in securing the release of hostages in Lebanon.124  This scenario is similar to the 
U.S. covert program to provide other military equipment to Iran in exchange for the 
release of American hostages seized following the Iranian Revolution.  This transaction 
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rist attacks and assisting the U.S. with their efforts to topple the 
Taliban
 rces, providing substantial 
arding its nuclear 
program
     
came to be known as the Iran-Contra Affair.  One must ask why, if religious ideology is 
at the heart of Iranian foreign policy, then why they would enter agreements with “The 
Great Satan?”  Ramazani provides the answer: “when Iran’s ideological and strategic 
interests collide, as they did in the 1980s, strategic considerations consistently 
prevailed.”125  Another example of calculation beyond theology is Iranian President 
Seyed Mohammad Khatami’s first major political address being directed not toward 
Iranians, but rather toward Americans.  In this address, he attempted to build a bridge 
between the U.S. and Iran by highlighting the similarities between the American and 
Iranian revolutions.126  Khatami’s administration worked to overcome impressions of 
Iranian radical fundamentalism in foreign policy going so far as to condemn the 
September 11, 2001 terro
 in Afghanistan. 
The Afghan Islamists evinced visceral hatred for Shi’ites, fueling Iranian 
fear and anger.  Ousting them from power, increasing Iranian influence on 
its neighbour and returning the many Afghan refugees living in Khorasan 
province were the Islamic Republic’s barely concealed wishes.  As a 
result, Iran cooperated with U.S. military fo
assistance to Operation Enduring Freedom.127 
Unfortunately, these overtures, clear examples of rational state behavior, have been 
mainly forgotten as Iran was proclaimed a member of the “Axis of Evil” by President 
George W. Bush.  Interestingly, it was the Bush administration that received an overture 
from Iran (via Swiss intermediaries) in order to open a dialog reg
 and reach a consensus: an overture that was flatly rejected.128 
From Iran’s perspective, it was the ultimate betrayal.  Tehran had worked 
with America to get rid of a dangerous adversary.  Then, without warning, 
Washington turned around, branded it a member of the “axis of evil.”  In 
the meantime, the U.S. closed ranks with a country, Pakistan, that did 
precisely what Washington accused Iran of wishing to do: acquiring a 
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and historical and theoretical models can be applied to 
assess their threat to the U.S., Iranian nuclear weapons may be delivered in one of two 
 concluded that Iran will not even build a 
nuclear
                                                
nuclear bomb, harbour terrorists and provide support to militants in a 
neighboring country, Afghanistan.129 
Based on all of this, it appears that Iran is just as rational an actor as the U.S.  
Since Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons capabilities can be explained in terms of 
countering real or perceived threats to the state, increasing state prominence in the 
international community, and attainment of hegemonic power in the Middle East, then 
they are clearly rational actors 
ways: direct use or indirect use. 
E. THE CASE FOR THE NUCLEAR OPTION 
There is a shadow hanging over U.S. pronouncements regarding the Iranian 
nuclear program.  This shadow stems from previous failures to correctly assess the extent 
and intent of weapons of mass destruction on the part of Iraq.  This shadow has led to a 
much more cautious interpretation of Iranian nuclear capabilities, potentially costing the 
U.S. time in working out a solution to the current situation and risking incongruence with 
allies.  While it appears clear that the U.S. is not looking for another fight, the Iranians 
likely are looking to shift the advantage in their favor if a fight does come, especially if 
the fight is from the U.S., Israel, or Pakistan.  A nuclear armed Iran is not likely to result 
in an immediate war, but it will likely result in a shift in the balance of power in the 
Middle East: a shift the Iranians will capitalize on in order to assert themselves more 
forcefully onto the regional and world stage in order to regain their perceived rightful 
place in the world order.  Bueno de Mesquita, a pioneer in the use of computer models 
and game theory to analyze political science, has
 bomb at all: he contends that “the less America tries to influence Iran, the more 
quickly Iran will abandon nuclear weapons.”130 
This section reviewed the current U.S.-Iranian situation with detachment in order 
to develop an objective understanding of what is known about Iran’s nuclear program 
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 foundation to support an evaluation of Iranian policy in terms 
f a balance of pragmatism and idealism that supports the notion that they are in fact 
tional actors on the world stage. 
 
 
                                                
from a historical and contemporary perspective, while exploring the back and forth 
between critics and supporters of the most current National Intelligence Estimate on Iran 
conducted in 2007, and concluded that the 2007 estimate likely underestimates Iran’s 
capability and intent regarding nuclear weapons.  In evaluating support and opposition 
for U.S. intelligence estimates of Iran, and seeing the issue from the Iranian perspective, 
this chapter has shown that Iran is likely on its way to obtaining nuclear weapons out of 
“Persian pride, a desire for technical prestige, and a sense of regional leadership.”131  
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IV. DIRECT USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: 
WILL THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM RESULT IN 
NUCLEAR WAR? 
A. INTRODUCTION TO DIRECT EMPLOYMENT 
There is a tremendous debate within the international community regarding Iran’s 
perceived efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and the possible ramifications of such a 
move.  While Iran has a history of provocative action and confrontation with the West, 
the development of nuclear power and the acquisition of nuclear weapons can be 
explained in terms of normal state behavior based on the assumption that Iran is both a 
rational actor and that a new multi-polar world order is emerging in which states such as 
China and India are seeking a greater share of international power.  Iranian nuclear 
technology ambitions are likely motivated by their expectation that domestic oil reserves 
will be depleted over the next 90 years, plus some argue that it is cheaper and more 
environmentally friendly to produce electricity using nuclear sources instead of fossil 
fuels, not to mention the fact that there is a certain degree of prestige associated with 
nuclear power.132  By looking at current intelligence estimates, Iranian intentions and 
motivations, as well as the rationality of Iran, one can develop a realistic assessment of 
their nuclear technology ambitions. 
As stated in Chapter III, the results of such an assessment appear to support the 
conclusion that Iran is in fact pursuing some sort of nuclear weapons capability.  Such a 
conclusion does not mean that Iran has a specific intent to employ such weapons 
immediately against a global or regional rival, nor does it necessarily mean that a transfer 
to terrorists is imminent.  As noted in Chapter I, despite multiple states developing 
nuclear weapons, only the U.S. ever developed nuclear them with a specific target in 
mind.  Though nuclear weapons have been developed in order to counter conventional or 
nuclear superiority on the part of a state’s rivals, for example the U.S.S.R. developed 
nuclear weapons to counter U.S. weapons and Pakistan developed theirs to counter  
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India’s.  If Iran does in fact have a target in mind for nuclear weapons (either 
immediately or in the event of future conflict), then they must be delivered through one 
of two ways: direct use or indirect use. 
The first employment scenario is of concern from a homeland defense 
perspective: direct use of a nuclear weapon against the continental United States; 
American military forces in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia; or against U.S. allies in 
the region or around the globe.  In evaluating the possibility of such an action, the 
historical model of the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War provides a calming, 
though sobering insight.  During the Cold War, both the Americans and the Soviets 
possessed nuclear weapons, as the U.S. and Iran likely will by the middle of the next 
decade.133  Also, despite periods of allied cooperation (the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were 
allies during World War II, just as the U.S. and Iran were allies following World War II), 
an adversarial relationship developed (as the U.S. and Iran have experienced since 1979).  
Despite their animosity toward one another, numerous opportunities for conflict, and 
extreme divergence of ideology, there was never a nuclear exchange between the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union.  Kenneth Waltz explains that this was the case due to the cost of 
nuclear weapons outweighing any benefit the state would gain by employing them.134  A 
nuclear strike against a nuclear-armed opponent invites a nuclear retaliatory strike, thus, 
the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) that kept an uneasy peace during the 
Cold War.  Scott Sagan takes a divergent position however.  In his assessment, the spread 
of nuclear weapons has a destabilizing effect on the world because it increases the 
probability of accidents and miscalculations that could touch off war. 
Direct use of nuclear weapons will be addressed in this section, while indirect use 
will be addressed in the next chapter.  Having established in Chapter III that Iran is a 
rational actor, one must review the cost/benefit relationship in using nuclear weapons.  If 
a given state possesses nuclear weapons and employs them against another state that also 
possesses nuclear weapons, then there is a reasonable expectation that they will face a 
 
133 National Intelligence Council, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities” (November 2007). 
134 Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: 
W. W. Norton & Company, 2002), 6–8. 
 47
                                                
retaliatory strike from the targeted state.  Is Iran willing to risk a retaliatory attack from a 
nuclear armed state?  If so, for what reason would they do so and can they be deterred?  
Does Iran believe the U.S. would employ nuclear weapons in retaliation for Iranian 
nuclear strikes against U.S. allies?  Jeffrey Lewis provides four points necessary for 
deterring Iran from nuclear attacks.135  The U.S. should ensure that Iran knows it will 
remain at a disadvantage both in conventional and nuclear arms, use detailed deterrent 
language to make U.S. response doctrines clear, reaffirm security commitments to allies 
potentially targeted by Iran, and define the terms of an acceptable relationship between 
the two countries. 
B. EMPLOYING THE NUCLEAR OPTION 
Under what conditions would Iran resort to direct employment of nuclear 
weapons?  Such a question sets up a situation similar to the Cold War in which the U.S. 
and U.S.S.R. both possessed nuclear weapons and had diametrically opposed political, 
ideological, and economic systems.  Despite their mutual hostility and covert efforts to 
undermine and weaken the other, neither resorted to the employment of nuclear weapons.  
The reason for this is simply that the cost of using nuclear weapons greatly outweighs the 
benefits gained if the opposing state can counter-strike with nuclear weapons.  Since both 
maintained robust nuclear capabilities, neither side was able to achieve a significant 
enough advantage to make direct use acceptable.  Would such a dynamic balance be 
attainable with Iran?  Earlier chapters discussed Iranian motivations for nuclear weapons 
development and established that they were likely pursuing nuclear weapons technology 
out of fear of military and/or political pressures, as well as for the sake of national pride, 
technical prestige, and the goal of regional leadership.136  Such motivations are similar to 
Soviet motivations to counter perceived American atomic power following the Second 
World War.  Soviet nuclear weapons research and development was meant to match or 
outpace U.S. efforts in order to prevent the U.S. from gaining a significant advantage in 
the emerging post-World War II order. 
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Stephen Younger points out that: 
At the end of the Second World War, the Soviet government saw itself 
surrounded by an American-led alliance dedicated to its containment – or 
even destruction.137   
Despite wartime alliances with Washington, the Soviets viewed the development of the 
American atomic bomb as a clear and present threat to the survival of their political, 
economic, and social way of life.  This threat created a situation in which national 
survival rested on their ability to counter U.S. efforts to develop more numerous and 
powerful atomic weapons.  As noted in Chapter III, Iran sees itself encircled by the U.S. 
and its allies today.  Iranian political, economic, and social systems are currently under 
pressure through both sanctions and rhetoric by Western powers, especially the U.S. and 
Israel, thus, lending support to the notion that their development of nuclear technologies 
may simply be the result a desire to ease pressure on their country.  Further, Joseph 
Cirincione notes that: 
[Joseph] Stalin saw the [atomic] bomb as more than a weapon.  It was also 
a symbol of industrial might, scientific accomplishment, and national 
prestige.  Stalin told his scientists, “Hiroshima has shaken the whole 
world.  The balance has been broken.  Build the bomb – it will remove the 
great danger from us.”138 
Such comments could easily come from Tehran today.  Iranian desires to assert 
themselves as the preeminent power in the Middle East and escape Western containment 
require bold action on the world stage.  The development of nuclear technologies serves 
this purpose on numerous fronts as it serves as both a warning and an inspiration to other 
Muslim countries (many targets of bold U.S. foreign policy action during the Global War 
on Terror) and creates an uncertainty in Western attempts to determine Iranian military 
strengths when contemplating contingency plans.  Patrick Clawson and Michael 
Eisenstadt note that: 
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Whereas North Korea may have developed nuclear weapons out of 
desperation, Iran is pursuing them as much out of aspiration – to be 
accepted as a great power with modern technology.139 
So is there a situation in which Iran might use nuclear weapons directly against 
the U.S.?  By exploring the similarities between Soviet and Iranian nuclear development 
and the balance of power that developed between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. during the 
Cold War, it would appear that the Iranians are not likely attempting to match American 
conventional or nuclear firepower for a direct confrontation, rather they are attempting to 
gain prestige and a greater degree of freedom of movement in the political realm.  A 
dominant fear among Iranian political leadership is U.S. and Israeli threats of regime 
change.  It therefore seems likely that the most probable scenario in which Iran might 
employ nuclear weapons is either in retaliation for a first strike by another party (as is 
likely the case with all nuclear powers) or to counter overt, aggressive, and dynamic 
attempts at regime change.  The importance of regime change and options for 
incorporating it into a U.S.-Iranian deterrence model is addressed in the next section. 
Is there even a scenario in which Iran would use nuclear weapons against a 
regional rival such as Israel?  Israel has long been one of the loudest voices speaking to 
against Iranian nuclear efforts.  While not committed to the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty themselves, Israel frequently denounces Iran for its efforts to develop nuclear 
technology while it has already invested in a significant stockpile itself.140  Trita Parsi 
notes that: 
Israel’s fear of a nuclear Iran is understandable, even though Israel does 
not believe that Iran would necessarily use the doomsday weapon against 
it.  That would surely lead to Iran’s own destruction: Iranian civilian and 
military leaders are well aware of Israel’s arsenal of over two hundred 
nuclear warheads and its second-strike capability through its three nuclear-
equipped Dolphin submarines.  And contrary to the depiction of the 
Iranians as “mad mullahs,” most strategic thinkers in Israel recognize that 
the Iranian government is extremist and radical—but rational.141 
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Israeli doctrine previously focused on eradication of its regional rival, striking the Soviet 
Union in the event of a nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., as well as a 
policy known as the “Samson Option” in which retreating Israeli forces would detonate 
nuclear weapons on their own soil to prevent being overrun by invaders.142  Ultimately, 
Israel’s concerns are based on a strategic rivalry more than they are on irrational actions 
on the part of Iran.  “The real danger to Israel of a nuclear-capable Iran is twofold:” first, 
a nuclear Iran would inhibit Israel’s ability to control the Middle East peace process, and 
second, a nuclear Iran would compel the U.S. to recognize Iran as a regional power on 
par with Israel.143 
C. DETERRING THE NUCLEAR OPTION 
Models of deterrence exist to contain direct and indirect usage of nuclear 
weapons, but if Iranian motivations and degree of rationality differ from those of 
historical actors, then previous understanding about the rules of nuclear brinksmanship 
may not apply.  This raises the final problem addressed in this chapter: can Iran be 
deterred from using nuclear weapons?  If Iran is a rational actor legitimately pursuing a 
nuclear weapons program, then Cold War models help us assess the possibility of 
deterrence as a strategy toward Iran.  A theoretical model based on what has been 
observed so far with Pakistan will be used to evaluate the same thing within the realm of 
state sponsorship of nuclear terrorism in the next chapter. 
Thus far, it appears that Iran is in fact a rational actor and is pursuing nuclear 
weapons not for an imminent war, but rather for relief from military and political 
pressures, as well as national pride, prestige, and assertion of regional leadership.  This is 
similar enough to the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cold War model to apply the basic tenants of 
deterrence as observed for roughly 50 years, yet there are key differences that have to be 
recognized and addressed in order to ensure there are no miscalculations between a 
nuclear-armed Iran and the U.S.  Keith Payne provides a definition to use in the present 
discussion: “deterrence and coercion consist of using threats as leverage to change the 
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behavior of a target audience.”144  In order to establish an effective policy of deterrence 
with Iran, Jeffrey Lewis suggests four essential steps the U.S. should undertake.145  First, 
the U.S. should repeatedly stress the fact that a modest acquisition of nuclear weapons by 
Iran would not off-set the significant strategic advantage the U.S. currently possesses.  
Second, it is important that the U.S. make clear, unambiguous threats regarding the 
employment or transfer of nuclear weapons by Iran.  This is an area in which the U.S. 
may have a long way to go in order to gain credibility. Keith Payne notes that: 
A look at apparent Iranian violations of Washington’s expressed red lines 
and the lack of significant, apparent consequences for transgressing those 
lines illustrates that deterrence is not just about having overwhelming 
military capabilities, but includes laying out red lines that the opponent 
believes will carry intolerable consequences if crossed.146 
Since the U.S. has failed to carry out appreciable action following Iranian transgressions 
in the past, then why should Iran expect action if it crosses red lines in the future?  Third, 
the reaffirmation of defense commitments to regional allies must be stressed in order to 
negate fear of Iranian nuclear weapons possession and curb efforts to counter Iranian 
efforts that could lead to a Middle East arms race.  Finally, the U.S. should engage Iran in 
order to establish the parameters under which a nuclear-armed Iran may live in peace 
with the U.S.  Such a move must come before Iran acquires a complete nuclear weapons 
capability in order to preempt any miscalculations regarding what Iran stands to gain in 
terms of its relationship with the U.S. 
As stated in both Chapter III and previously in this chapter, Iran has a significant 
fear of U.S. efforts directed toward regime change.  “The threat of regime change for the 
clerical rulers is thus existential, compelling them to seek the nuclear option regardless of 
Iran’s national interest.”147  The U.S. has worked to use this fear to its advantage over the 
past several years by threatening Iran covertly and overtly, yet has produced relatively 
little in the way of diplomatic progress.  The development of nuclear weapons however 
 
144 Payne, “Deterring Iran,” 2. 
145 Lewis, “Assumptions Underlying the Debate on Deterring Emerging Nuclear States,” 22–23. 
146 Payne, “Deterring Iran,” 3. 
147 Mokhtari, “No One Will Scratch My Back,” 227. 
 52
                                                
offers a new opportunity to incorporate a dialog about U.S. intentions for Iranian regime 
change into the diplomatic process between the two countries.  Karim Sadjadpour 
highlights the importance of regime survival to the Iranian government: “the continued 
survival of the Islamic Republic is the paramount goal that unites the regime’s political 
elite.”148  The removal of the threat of regime change by the U.S. would potentially serve 
two purposes.  First, it would make the Iranian regime more secure, therefore less likely 
to pursue reckless actions to counter perceived U.S. threats.  Second, survival of the 
regime, while not necessarily a popular course of action among Western powers, would 
ensure a stable political structure in Iran that would provide better control over nuclear 
technologies.  Karim Sadjadpour also notes that this intense desire for regime survival 
makes Iran “extremely unlikely to use a nuclear weapon for offensive purposes.”149  
Joseph Cirincione highlights the fact that the U.S. has expressed to North Korea that it 
has “no hostile intentions toward [that] state” and that “an end to that country’s [nuclear] 
program would lead to the restoration of diplomatic relations.”150  It is not unreasonable 
to pursue a similar line of diplomacy with Iran. 
The U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons represents a counterbalance to Iranian 
first-strike options, as does the Israeli nuclear arsenal: therefore there is a double 
inhibiting factor present to restrain Iranian nuclear aggression.  Throughout the Cold 
War, the U.S. nuclear stockpile provided a credible deterrent to Soviet threats.  The same 
is likely to serve in the case of Iran.  As long as the U.S. makes its policies of reprisal for 
attack and defense of allies perfectly clear, and so long as it maintains a healthy, robust, 
and active nuclear force, the likelihood of a direct Iranian nuclear attack are exceedingly 
low.  Stephen Younger sums up the importance of continued U.S. nuclear readiness best 
when he states: 
 
 
148 Karim Sadjadpour, “Oil or the Atom?  The Economic Underpinnings of Iranian Power,” Deterring 
the Ayatollahs: Complications in Applying Cold War Strategy to Iran, Patrick Clawson and Michael 
Eisenstadt, eds., 28. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Cirincione, Bomb Scare, 151. 
 53
                                                
Nuclear weapons are no longer needed to deter a massive Soviet attack on 
the United States or an invasion of Western Europe.  However, just as they 
did during the Cold War, they maintain a strategic balance, assuring each 
side that it cannot hope to prevail over the other.  This balance has spread 
beyond the dyad of the United States and Russia—other nations recognize 
America’s conventional military supremacy and have decided to weather 
international condemnation to build the only type of weapon that could 
defeat us on the battlefield.151 
Since, however, the Iranians are decades away from developing a nuclear capability equal 
to the U.S. and there is a significant threat of reprisal, there is no threat to the U.S. from 
an Iranian nuclear first strike.  Iranian nuclear weapons will likely shift the balance of 
power in the Middle East somewhat away from Israel, thus, an explanation for their 
intense desire to prevent Iran from acquiring such a capability.  Iranian nuclear weapons 
will put Middle Eastern states other than Israel in a position that will make them 
uncomfortable.  Two such countries are Saudi Arabia and Egypt.  Israel will likely 
increase both the flexibility and survivability of its nuclear force, while Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt may begin nuclear programs of their own to off-set potential Iranian leadership in 
the Muslim world. 
In summary, the rational-actor model is a theoretical paradigm used for analyzing 
organizational behavior that looks at behavioral choice in terms of a cost/benefit analysis 
of the expected outcome.152  Under this model, a government is said to be rational if it 
pursues policies that maximize reward while minimizing cost.  Graham Allison asserts 
that to be rational, states must: (1) be unitary actors; (2) calculate the risks and benefits of 
actions prior to action, then choose the most beneficial course of action; (3) recognize the 
reality of an anarchical international system; and (4) pursue security through power.153  
All of these are consistent with Iran’s nuclear related activities.  The Iranians have 
political and ideological divisions within their country just as the U.S. does.  Despite 
internal debates between politicians, scientists, and military personnel, one consistent 
course of action can be seen as the country transitions from one Supreme Leader to 
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another and one President to another.  For example, Ayatollah Khomeini reversed Iran’s 
policy on not pursuing WMD in response to Iraq use of chemical weapons in during the 
Iran-Iraq war: Ayatollah Khamenei has not countermanded this policy once coming to 
office.  Iranian policy makers have consistently evaluated actions in terms of a 
cost/benefit analysis.  Economic, strategic, and technical factors all have played a part in 
Iran’s decisions to support various groups and governments.  For example, Iran‘s support 
of Hezbollah can be explained in terms of bolstering support for Iran from the Arab 
street.  The Islamic Republic clearly recognizes the inability of other states to provide for 
its security in the Middle East.  Iranian foreign policy decisions consistently reflect the 
dynamic, often changing security situation in the Middle East.  For example, Iran’s 
support of U.S. efforts to topple the Taliban in Afghanistan: a radical Sunni regime that 
posed a direct threat to Shi’a Iran.  Finally, Iranian efforts to secure international 
diplomatic, economic, and military power are possible through the development of a 
limited nuclear arsenal. 
D. DIRECT EMPLOYMENT CONCLUSIONS 
International concern regarding Iran’s perceived efforts to acquire nuclear 
weapons and the possible ramifications of such a move are justified.  Such efforts have 
the potential to destabilize the balance of power in the Middle East and allow Iran to 
emerge from the economic and political leper status imposed upon it by 30 years of 
Western sanctions and harsh rhetoric.  Iran has a history of provocative action and 
confrontation with the West, it has provided direct and indirect challenges to Western 
desires in the region, and it has also been an active supporter of terrorist organization.  
The development of nuclear technology and the acquisition of nuclear weapons can 
however be explained in terms of normal state behavior based on the assumption that Iran 
is both a rational actor and that a new multi-polar world order is emerging, rather than as 
another Iranian provocation.  Iranian nuclear power ambitions are likely motivated by its 
expectation that domestic oil reserves will be depleted over the next 90 years, plus some 
argue that it is cheaper and more environmentally friendly to produce electricity using 
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nuclear sources instead of fossil fuels, not to mention the fact that there is a certain 
degree of prestige associated with nuclear power.154 
It is likely that Iran is in fact pursuing some sort of nuclear weapons capability.  
Such a conclusion does not mean that Iran has a specific intent to employ such weapons 
immediately against a global or regional rival, nor does it necessarily mean that a transfer 
to terrorists is imminent.  Direct use of a nuclear weapon against the continental United 
States; against American military forces in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia; or against 
U.S. allies in the region or around the globe is not a likely course of action for Iran, 
however, since there is a strong likelihood that they would face a debilitating counter-
strike.  In evaluating the possibility of Iranian direct use of nuclear weapons, a review of 
the historical model of the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War provided a 
compelling case why Iran can likely be deterred from employing such weapons in a direct 
manner.  The Soviet-American relationship during the Cold War is very similar to the 
U.S.-Iranian relationship today, but despite Soviet-American animosity toward one 
another, numerous opportunities for conflict, and extreme divergence of ideology, there 
was never a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union: the same will 
likely be the case between the U.S. and Iran.  For Iran, the purpose of nuclear weapons is 
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V. INDIRECT USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: 
WILL THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM RESULT IN 
NUCLEAR-ARMED TERRORISTS? 
A. INTRODUCTION TO INDIRECT USE 
The second possible employment scenario available to Iran is of concern from a 
homeland security perspective and will be the focus of this chapter: the possibility of 
indirect use (the passing of nuclear weapons to a surrogate agent, most likely a terrorist 
organization) against the U.S. itself or U.S. interests in the Middle East.  To evaluate this 
possibility, this thesis will refer to a theoretical model provided by Pakistan: the only 
Islamic state to develop nuclear weapons.  While there have been periods of instability 
and clashes of political, social, and economic ideologies within Pakistan, nuclear 
weapons have never been passed to terrorist organizations for the sake of economic 
profit, political advantage, or ideological support.  Pakistan represents a theoretical model 
rather than a historical model due to the relatively short time that they have possessed 
nuclear weapons.  The future of Pakistan’s form of government and degree of stability, 
level of cooperation with the U.S. in overseas contingency operations (formerly known as 
the Global War on Terrorism), and control over its nuclear know-how remain unclear, 
therefore it can only be said to represent a theoretical case as of now. 
In order to fully explore the possibility of Iranian nuclear weapons being passed 
to a terrorist organization, this section will explore state sponsorship of terrorism in 
general, Iranian sponsorship of terrorism in particular, as well as different aspects of state 
sponsorship of nuclear terrorism, and will finally evaluate Iran’s likely course of action 
using the theoretical model provided by Pakistan in light of their status as the only 
Islamic nuclear power and their relationship to terrorism. 
B. STATE SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM 
Despite its prevalence in contemporary society, terrorism is a phenomenon that 
defies clear, concise definitions and understanding.  For the purpose of this section, 
terrorism is defined as: 
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The use or threatened use of physical violence directed against victims 
selected for their symbolic or representative value as a means of instilling 
anxiety in, transmitting one or more messages to, and thereby 
manipulating the perceptions and behavior of a wider target audience.155 
Under this definition, states,as well as nonstate actors, are recognized as being capable of 
carrying out, directing, or providing material support for terrorist attacks.  Such a 
characterization is certainly controversial since no state will acknowledge support of 
terrorist, rather they will assure the international community that they are simply 
supporting “oppressed groups” or “freedom fighters.”  While attribution of states as 
perpetrators of terrorism is often problematic, it must be recognized that state security 
forces are better organized, funded, equipped, and trained to carry out acts that constitute 
terrorism than nonstate actors, plus states have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. 
States have the capacity to carry out terrorism either directly or indirectly.  Direct 
state terrorism occurs when state security forces directly carry out attacks against victims 
selected by the state itself normally for political reasons.  Hannah Arendt highlights such 
state terrorism in both Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union in her book The Origins 
of Totalitarianism.156  Indirect state terrorism is more subtle and can take one (or more) 
of seven different forms.157  First, state directed terrorism occurs when state security 
forces direct, guide, or control their intermediaries toward a specific act or series of acts.  
Second, true state sponsored terrorism refers to a situation in which state security forces 
provide hands-on operational assistance to intermediaries.  While this general term is 
typically used by the U.S. to identify any state that provides any level of support to 
terrorists, its academic application is much more precise.  Third, state supported terrorism 
occurs when state security forces provide logistical support (finance, weapons, safe 
houses, etc.) to their intermediaries.  Fourth, state manipulated terrorism involves covert 
manipulation of intermediaries by state security forces in order to facilitate acts of 
terrorism without that group’s full culpability.  Such operations are sometimes referred to 
as “False Flags.”  Fifth, state encouraged terrorism occurs when state security forces 
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incite intermediaries to carryout acts against mutual enemies for the benefit of the 
incumbent regime.  Sixth, state exploited terrorism is when the state knowingly attributes 
terrorist acts to false perpetrators (usually their enemies) to protect their intermediaries or 
weaken enemies of the state.  Finally, state sanctioned terrorism results when state 
security forces ignore or fail to act against their intermediaries for attacks against enemies 
of the state. 
Some advantages of state sponsorship of terrorism are highlighted by Bruce 
Hoffman in Countering the New Terrorism.158  States may choose to employ 
intermediaries to act as “surrogate warriors” in order to impact the domestic environment 
without the direct involvement of state security forces, thereby enjoying a degree of 
deniability in what occurs.159  In external issues, states may employ terrorists in order to 
attempt to avoid “identification, retaliation, and sanctions.”160  Under such 
circumstances, states may engage in asymmetric warfare against a superior force or 
equally armed rival while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability.  It is important to 
note however that a relationship between a state and a terrorist organization does not 
necessarily constitute sponsorship.  The degree of control states possess over their 
intermediaries and the reliability of those intermediaries are factors states must keep in 
mind as well because they represent two disadvantages of state sponsorship.  This is 
especially true when there is a chance that the state’s involvement will be detected or 
when the intermediaries may grow dissatisfied or ambitious a
Iran has a long and well-documented history of terrorism sponsorship.  Iranian 
sponsorship of terrorism is grounded in the Iranian Revolution of 1979.  The Iranian 








                                                
While scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal 
affairs of other nations, it supports the just struggles of the mustad'afun 
(downtrodden) against the mustakbirun (arrogant and powerful) in every 
corner of the globe.161 
The most well known “arrogant and powerful” for Iran to support the “downtrodden” 
against are the U.S. and Israel.  Iran’s support of Hezbollah (Party of God) in Lebanon 
since the Israeli invasion of 1982 has been an especially contentious issue.  Hezbollah is a 
radical Islamic, specifically Shi’ite, organization that provides social services to local 
residents, is involved in the government of Lebanon, and takes its ideological inspiration 
from Ayatollah Khomeini, architect of the Iranian Revolution.162  It was originally 
founded by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a means of spreading the 
ideology of the Iranian Revolution beyond the borders of Iran.  This organization is 
responsible for numerous kidnappings and suicide bombings against Israeli, U.S., and 
even French targets between 1983 and 1988 and is often cited as a major impediment to 
the Middle East peace process.163  Another such organization sponsored by Iran is the 
Islamic Resistance Movement (commonly referred to as Hamas).  This organization is a 
Palestinian social and political organization known to also posses a radical military wing.  
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi, and Mohammad Taha created Hamas in 
1987 during a Palestinian uprising against Israel that came to be known as “The First 
Intifada.”  Hamas has ties to not only Iran, but the Muslim Brotherhood founded in Egypt 
as well.  They are best known for two things: (1) attacks against Israel involving suicide 
operations, rockets, and shootings; and (2) their transformation into a political 
organization that won control of the Palestinian Parliament during elections in 2006.  
Further, Iran is also accused of providing operational support and guidance to the Kurdish 
Worker’s Party (PKK) and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP).164 
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Al Qaeda (The Base) is the terrorist organization that comes to mind for most 
Americans in the post September 11, 2001 world.  They are of interest here for two 
primary reasons: (1) they are a well financed, global organization that advocates attacks 
against the U.S. and (2) they have expressed an interest in acquiring weapons of mass 
destruction, especially nuclear weapons.165  These two factors make it logical to explore 
an Iran-Al Qaeda relationship.  Despite cultural and linguistic ties between Iran and 
Afghanistan, there is little common ground between the two countries.  Iran did oppose 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan beginning in 1979 and provided support to the 
mujahedeen (struggler or one who struggles in a jihad) during the Soviet occupation, but 
Iran later rejected the Taliban (students) regime that eventually consolidated power and 
took over the government implementing a harsh interpretation of Sharia (Islamic law).  
The Taliban were the protectors of Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda prior to the U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.  Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime both represent a 
fundamentalist interpretation of Sunni Islam known as Wahhabism.166  Despite the 
commonalities of anti-Westernism and anti-secularism, the Wahhabi orientation of Sunni 
Islam represents an anti-Shi’ite school of thought characterized by religious 
fundamentalism that is not compatible with Iranian Shi’ite ideology, thereby making an 
alliance between Al Qaeda and Iran not very likely.167  Mush of Iran’s rhetoric and 
support of terrorist organizations stems from the Sunni-Shi’a schism that split Islam in its 
early years.  Saudi Arabia launched an anti-Shi’a campaign following the Iranian 
Revolution with the intent of containing the radical forces of Shi’ism unleashed by 
Khomeini in 1979: Iran’s efforts can be viewed as a rational, yet asymmetric reaction to 




165 Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, 77–78. 
166 “Wahhaabism” is often synonymous with “Salafism” (from Salafi: “predecessors” referring to the 
early Muslim leaders.  Both represent an “Islamic revivalist social movement.”  Marc Sageman, 
Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 63. 
167 Jason Burke, Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (New York: I. B. Taurus, 2004), 60. 
168 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 104–105. 
 62
                                                
outside the U.S. following the September 11, 2001, attacks took place in Tehran: a key 
indication of Iranian animosity toward Al Qaeda and their Sunni fundamentalist 
supporters.169 
C. STATE SPONSORSHIP OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM 
Before addressing state sponsorship of nuclear weapons for terrorists, it is 
important to ask if terrorist would need such sponsorship.  Richard Falkenrath, Robert 
Newman, and Bradley Thayer argue that nonstate actors may not even need state 
sponsorship to acquire nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons for several reasons.170  
First, an expansion of technical and scientific knowledge, supported by educational 
opportunities and the Internet, make reliance on state sponsorship less necessary today 
than in the past.  This does not completely negate the fact there “remain[s] substantial 
technical difficulties in acquiring, weaponizing and delivering effective WMD.”171  
Second (though possibly a dated observation), controls over materials necessary for the 
fabrication of weapons of mass destruction are looser now than during the Cold War.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union led to gaps through which flowed the nuclear, 
biological, and chemical components necessary to make weapons of mass destruction.  
While controls have been tightened up with U.S. help and especially following the events 
of September 11, 2001, a full chain of custody for many of these materials is not 
available.  The limited shelf life of such components eases some of the worry in this 
respect, but does not completely eliminate it.  Finally, terrorists may not need such 
destructive weapons since conventional weapons are cheaper, more accessible, highly 
effective, and not likely to carry the same consequences as attacks with nuclear, 
biological, or chemical weapons.  As Walter Laqueur points out: 
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Broadly speaking, terrorists will not engage in overkill if their traditional 
weapons—the submachine gun and the conventional bomb—are sufficient 
to continue the struggle and achieve their aims.172 
While this may not be true in all cases, especially in cases of apocalyptic millenarian 
terrorists, it generally applies to the groups Iran currently provides support.  Mark 
Juergensmeyer notes that “the primary purpose of religious violence is not to coerce 
particular concessions, but to fulfill a spiritual requirement.”173  These terrorists are 
working to see “fulfillment in some transtemporal realm” rather than the objective 
changes Iran desires to see in the Middle East today.174  “Groups such as Hamas, 
Hizballah, and Islamic Jihad [all groups sponsored by Iran]…do not make the list of 
potential superterrorists:” that is, they are not likely to desire, acquire, or employ WMD 
in pursuit of their goals.175 
Many opponents of the Iranian nuclear program site state sponsorship of 
terrorism, on-going conflict with Israel, and threats to spread radical ideology as the 
primary motives for forcing Iran to cease its nuclear activities, yet there are historical and 
theoretical models that illustrate why Iran may not use nuclear technology for any of 
these reasons.  Iran, despite rhetoric and ideology, is a state and states pursue rational 
actions.176  States must conduct cost/benefit analyses of actions prior to undertaking them 
and act according to its best interests in terms of security and power.  While many states 
have sponsored terrorist groups in the past, no states have ever passed nuclear weapons to 
them.177  Even at the height of the Cold War and despite support to extremist 
organizations, neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. provided nuclear weapons to nonstate 
actors.  If two of the greatest antagonists in modern history refrained from such reckless 
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acts in the midst of their ideological conflict and desire to spread their visions of world 
order, then why would Iran be any different?  Additionally, despite the extreme rhetoric 
directed at Israel by Iranian leaders and support to terrorist organizations that target 
Israeli interests provided by Iran, Israel has never employed nuclear weapons against its 
enemies.  If Israel, a state identified by a religious, as well as a secular identity, has 
refrained from employing nuclear weapons, why would we expect Iran to be any 
different?  Finally, all ideologies are reflections of a given worldview; therefore 
conflicting ideologies are considered radical when viewed from a competing worldview.  
For example, the spread of communism represented a potential threat to the U.S. during 
the Cold War, while concepts such as radical Sunni Islam and regime change represent a 
potential threat to Iran today.  If the U.S. was not willing to resort to the use of nuclear 
weapons in order to counter the communist threat, why would Iran have to resort to 
nuclear weapons to overcome its potential threats? 
In order to objectively address Iranian nuclear ambitions, it is necessary to 
establish the most likely scenarios for employment of Iranian nuclear weapons and 
evaluate their likelihood.  One such scenario in which Iranian nuclear weapons could be 
used is one involving the use of surrogates to carry out attacks.  States have not employed 
this tactic thus far for the same basic reason that states have not directly employed 
nuclear weapons as discussed in the previous chapter: the cost is too high.  Through 
forensics and intelligence, it is unlikely that such an act could be kept secret; therefore it 
would invite the same retribution as a direct nuclear strike.  Additionally, as Falkenrath 
and his colleagues point out, another significant issue to consider when addressing state 
sponsorship of nuclear terrorism is control. 
State sponsors of international terrorism lack perfect control over the 
groups they support and are therefore unwilling to run the enormous risks 





178 Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer, America’s Achilles Heel, 219–220. 
 65
                                                
This point is expanded upon and reinforced by Laqueur: 
Governments, however ruthless, ambitious, and ideologically extreme, 
will be reluctant to pass on unconventional weapons to terrorist groups 
over which they cannot have full control; the governments may be 
tempted to use such arms themselves in a first strike, but it is more 
probable that they would employ them in blackmail than in actual 
warfare.179 
No matter how committed the leadership of the state is to their ideology, they must take 
actions that will provide for the survival of the regime.  Employment of nuclear weapons 
either directly or indirectly risks the survivability of the regime, especially in cases of 
smaller, more lightly armed states such as Iran will likely be for the foreseeable future, 
and therefore neither scenario appears very likely. 
Iran’s ambition, after all, is to become the region’s undisputed power; 
given its tendency to view all other actors as potential competitors, it’s 
hardly likely Tehran would undermine its goal by sharing sensitive 
technology.180 
D. THE PAKISTANI MODEL 
In order to apply these assumptions about nuclear weapons to a real world 
example, one must now examine Pakistan.  Pakistan entered the nuclear weapons club in 
1992, when it announced that it had achieved the know-how to build a nuclear bomb.  
This was in direct response to perceived threats from India, its nuclear next-door 
neighbor.181  The two states have been rivals ever since their creation following the 
division of the Indian sub-continent by Britain in 1947, a process that led to one-half 
million deaths as the Muslim, Sikh, and Hindu populations shifted to one state or the 
other.182  Both have made overt and veiled threats to use their nuclear weapons against 
one another during several tense times as the two states dealt with conflicts ranging from 
Kashmir to religion to territorial boundaries.  The two first went to war in 1947 following 
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allegations of Pakistani support for a Muslim insurrection in Kashmir.  A United Nations 
brokered cease fire took effect in 1949, but disputes continue to this day over the region 
including additional conventional wars in 1965 and 1971, as well as an insurgency in 
1989.  In the 1990s, nuclear weapons became a major concern as the two powers 
embarked on a nuclear arms race to extend their capabilities and apparently acquire an 
advantage over the other.  Devin Hagerty identifies three key motivations for both India 
and Pakistan’s drive toward nuclear weapons: national security, international respect, and 
domestic politics.183  In 1999, the two countries again went to war.  The conflict 
remained conventional most likely due to the costly nature of escalation to a nuclear 
conflict, as well as international intervention to help broker a cease fire.  This supports 
Waltz’s assertions that the spread of nuclear weapons will actually facilitate restraint by 
states and prevent conventional war from escalating into nuc
An indirect employment scenario is more difficult to illustrate, but is present none 
the less.  Pakistan is a complex country.  Its leaders first developed a formal constitution 
in 1956, but it remained in place for only two years before being suspended by General 
Ayub Khan.  A second attempt to govern via constitutional processes went into effect in 
1973, but lasted only until 1977.  The Pakistani military has played a dominant role in the 
political process through most of its history with military officers serving as President 
roughly 23 out of its 62 years of existence.  This is not surprising since the Pakistani 
military is the seventh largest in the world and the population has struggled with poverty, 
dissatisfaction with political leadership, and frequent threats from its neighbors.  Pakistan 
is predominantly a Muslim country (roughly 95% of its population is Muslim) and most 
of its conflicts have been tied to religion (such is the case in direct conflict with India and 
volunteer support of Muslims against Israel and the U.S.S.R.).  Dissatisfaction with 
leadership has recently resulted from Pakistan’s increasingly moderate stance.  Many 
Pakistani scientists, military officers, and religious leaders objected to former President 
Pervez Musharraf’s (himself a general who seized power from a democratically elected 
leader) support of the U.S. in the Global War on Terror, as well as the decreasing 
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importance their country plays in the Islamic world.  Many of them felt that they had a 
duty to elevate Islamic Civilization to a level equal to or greater than that of Christian, 
Jewish, and Hindu Civilizations.184  This is manifested by the desire of many of these 
scientists to share nuclear technology with all Muslims, even Al Qaeda, in order to 
provide “a bomb for the Ummah” (a community of believers, especially Muslim believers 
around the world).185 
Gordon Corera highlights the story of Sultan Bashiruddin Mahood186 and Abdul 
Majeed, two former Pakistani nuclear scientists who are known for their Islamic 
fundamentalist zeal and their arrest by Pakistani authorities for meeting with Osama bin 
Laden in Afghanistan in 2001.187  The meeting with Osama bin Laden allegedly centered 
on their Islamic identity and their desire to spread nuclear technology beyond Pakistan to 
other Islamic countries.  They are also said to have discussed how to make a nuclear 
bomb, how to employ nuclear materials Al Qaeda had already acquired (allegedly 
obtained from contacts in the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan), and the manufacture of 
weapons of mass destruction.188  They, and several of their colleagues from Pakistan’s 
military and intellectual societies, possessed a wealth of technical knowledge about the 
fabrication and delivery of nuclear weapons, yet there is no evidence to suggest that any 
of their meetings resulted in anything other than speculation and theory.  Mahood himself 
described the meetings as “academic.”189  His son, commenting on the meeting, noted 
that it was a very straightforward discussion: 
Basically Osama asked my father, ‘How can a nuclear bomb be made, and 
can you help us make one?’  Mahood is said to have told bin Laden that it 
would be very difficult to build a bomb.190 
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Additionally, despite the high level of these individuals and their access to the 
Pakistani nuclear program, there is no indication of complicity on the part of the 
government of Pakistan in arranging, sponsoring, or even allowing the meeting with Al 
Qaeda to take place.  This is the case because Pakistan knows the risks associated with 
transfer of nuclear weapons to intermediaries: the same risks that will restrain Iran. 
The Pakistani nuclear program is infamous for its proliferation aspect.  Dr. Abdul 
Qadeer Khan, the “Father of Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb,” built a now famous black market 
empire based on the nuclear trade.191  His customers are known to have included such 
countries as Iran, North Korea, and Libya.192  Former Central Intelligence Agency 
Director George Tenet remarked that “Khan and his network had been unique in being 
able to offer one-stop shopping for enrichment technology and weapons design 
information.”193  Such activities may have been the result of an individual motivated by 
idealism or financial greed, or they may have been an officially directed program of 
cooperation and fundraising directed by the Pakistani government itself.194  Either way, 
the proliferation was limited to states: no nonstate actors have as yet acquired nuclear 
weapons through state sponsorship, independent methods (though Al Qaeda has 
approached various scientists in an effort to do so195), or through theft (though the Red 
Army Faction did attempt the theft of nuclear weapons from U.S. forces in Germany in 
1977196). 
In terms of passing nuclear weapons to nonstate actors, Pakistan is the closest 
country to which Iran can be compared for several reasons.  First, Pakistan is the only 
Islamic state to develop nuclear weapons.  This is significant considering Iran is a 
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theocratic regime with Shi’a Islam at its heart and a publically stated desire to export the 
principles of the Iranian Revolution to freedom fighters around the world.  Second, 
Pakistan has a long history of ties to radical state and nonstate actors such as the 
Afghanistan mujahedeen during the Soviet occupation, the Taliban regime that ruled 
Afghanistan 1996 through 2001, and numerous allegations of Pakistani intelligence 
connections with radical elements in Kashmir.  Iran has long been recognized as a major 
supporter of terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and various sectarian groups in Iraq.  
Finally, both Pakistan and India, its regional rival, possess nuclear weapons and have been 
involved in on-going overt and covert military conflict for an extended period.  Iran’s 
primary regional rival is Israel: a country that is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons 
and a history of both overt and covert conflict with Iran.  Religious orientation, ties to 
extremists, and unbalanced regional rivalries all combine to provide a solid case for a 
Pakistan-Iran comparison.  In this thesis, Pakistan is considered to be a theoretical model 
rather than a historical model because of their short time as a nuclear power and the 
evolving nature of their power structure.  Inferences about correlations between Pakistan 
and Iran must be made on the relatively short trends in Pakistan, rather than a long 
standing, relatively stable political structure like the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. possessed 
during the Cold War. 
Further predictions about Iranian nuclear support for terrorism can be made by 
looking at the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War.  Specifically, while the 
conflict was waged across the globe through various intermediaries, neither country ever 
transferred nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons to terrorists of any ideological 
milieu.  This is significant because both sides supported insurgent groups that could 
easily be labeled terrorists, yet their support stopped short of providing weapons of mass 
destruction.  This is an important additional variable to consider when assessing the 
possibility of Iranian support for nuclear terrorism.  As Graham Allison points out: 
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union each knew 
that an attack against the other would elicit a retaliatory strike of 
commensurate or greater measure; but [Al Qaeda has] no such fear of 
reprisal.197 
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The country that provides them, or any other terrorist organization, nuclear materials 
should however have fear of reprisal, as well as isolation from the international 
community.  This is likely the very same rationale that has prevented Iran from passing 
chemical weapons to any of its surrogates.198  These are outcomes divergent from those 
desired by countries such as India, Pakistan, and Iran: national security, international 
respect, and domestic politics.  Allison argues that a more comprehensive structure is 
necessary to add greater credibility to the deterrence aspect of preventing nuclear 
terrorism, but a rudimentary system is in existence now. 199 
E. INDIRECT EMPLOYMENT CONCLUSIONS 
As previously established, Iran is a rational state and will likely act in accordance 
with certain basic rules.  States are unitary actors that calculate the risks and benefits of 
actions prior to making decisions, then choose the most beneficial course of action in 
recognition of the reality of an anarchical international system, and the need to pursue 
security through power.200  Iran has a long history of supporting terrorist organizations 
for strategic reasons: is it possible that they would consider expanding this support to 
include nuclear weapons?  If they are such a willing supplier of arms, equipment, and 
training for nonnuclear terrorism, then why would they restrain themselves from adding 
nuclear support to the list?  For the same reason that they would not employ nuclear 
weapons directly: the cost outweighs the benefit.  As Richard Erickson puts it, “states that 
tolerate international terrorism are liable under state responsibility” for their actions.201  
Nuclear forensics and intelligence make it possible, though not completely certain, that 
the origins of such a device would be traced to the sponsoring state, thereby making that 
state vulnerable for retaliation.202  “The risk of detection and subsequent sever retaliation 
or punishment is great, and while this may not deter terrorists it may put off their 
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sponsors and suppliers.”203  Due to uncertainty about the reliability of their 
intermediaries, possible retaliation from the targeted state, and the availability of 
reasonable alternatives to weapons of mass destruction for terrorists, state sponsorship of 
nuclear terrorism is not a likely or rational possibility for Iran to employ in order to 
pursue its national interests. 
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VI. ASSESSING THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR THREAT: 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS REVIEWED 
This thesis addressed two specific concerns in regard to Iran and its development 
of nuclear technology: does Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons represent a direct threat to 
the (1) defense and (2) security of the U.S. homeland?  It considered how likely the 
Iranian regime is to directly attack the U.S. with nuclear weapons, as well as the 
likelihood that Iranian nuclear materiel could be distributed to terrorists that would seek 
to detonate them within the U.S.  Neither of these scenarios appears to be likely so long 
as the U.S. maintains a credible strategic nuclear deterrent capability and clearly 
communicates its retaliation policy for both itself and its allies. 
The conflict between the U.S. and Iran is rooted in Iran’s national identity and in 
Western interference in the internal affairs of Iran throughout the twentieth century. 
Seen from the Iranian historical perspective, neither alliance nor 
neutrality, nor engagement has saved Iran from the designs of its foes.  If 
Iranians are to unlearn the lessons of their history, those responsible for 
teaching the lessons ought to rethink their ways.204 
This is important because it establishes not only who Iran is, but why the U.S. has had a 
hard time dealing with this country in the twentieth century and beyond.  A better 
understanding of Iran’s culture and history provides a better foundation upon which to 
make an assessment to address the overall research question.  Ultimately, current U.S.-
Iranian hostility has its roots in Western manipulation of Iran throughout the twentieth 
century and the resentment this creates among the Iranian regime and citizenry due to 
their perceptions as a great power in the Middle East.  Would the current situation be 
different if the U.S. had not chosen a course of action to remove Prime Minister 
Mossadegh in 1953? 
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We can only speculate on what might have been if Mossadegh had 
remained in power, but it is clear that America’s support of the shah 
engendered deep resentment.205 
Iran’s wealth of natural resources and strategic location has given it many blessings, yet 
they have also kept it in the sights of Western industrial powers.  Iranian nationalism 
combined with Shi’ism has led to the emergence of a people full of pride and a desire for 
self-determination that often challenges Western ideas for the role and direction of the 
Middle East.206  By reviewing the origins of the modern Iranian state, the turbulence of 
the twentieth century, and exploring the unique relationship between the U.S. and Iran in 
regard to the Iranian nuclear program, one can see the roots of conflict that have dug deep 
into the public perception and foreign policy of both countries.  In the case of the U.S. 
and Iran, “each protagonist is prisoner of its history, which is what makes it deaf to the 
other side’s grievances.”207 
Iran is likely pursuing nuclear weapons, or at least an option to quickly produce a 
nuclear weapon if sufficiently threatened by the U.S., Israel, or its Sunni Arab neighbors.   
Iran’s motivations for nuclear technology stem from its desire for security, prestige, etc.  
Such motivations lend credence to the notion that Iran is a rational state and is likely to 
pursue national interests over ideological zeal.  It also suggests that the likelihood of 
deterring Iran from developing a nuclear weapons option is not likely despite some 
lingering hope.208  This is significant because if it is pursuing an immediate or future 
weapons capability, one must ask if Iran can be deterred from directly employing such 
weapons or passing them on to terrorist organizations.  While it appears clear that the 
U.S. is not looking for another fight, the Iranians likely are looking to shift the advantage 
in their favor if a fight does come, especially if the fight is from the U.S., Israel, or 
Pakistan.  A nuclear armed Iran is not likely to result in an immediate war, but it will 
likely result in a shift in the balance of power in the Middle East: a shift the Iranians will 
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capitalize on in order to assert themselves more forcefully onto the regional and world 
stages in order to reassert their perceived rightful place in the world order. 
Chapter III reviewed the current U.S.-Iranian situation in order to develop an 
objective understanding of what is known about Iran’s nuclear program from a historical 
and contemporary perspective, while exploring the back and forth between critics and 
supporters of the most current National Intelligence Estimate on Iran conducted in 2007.  
In doing so, it has concluded that the 2007 estimate likely underestimates Iran’s 
capability and intent regarding nuclear weapons.  In evaluating support and opposition 
for U.S. intelligence estimates of Iran, and seeing the issue from the Iranian perspective, 
it is likely that Iran is on its way to obtaining nuclear weapons in pursuit of pride, 
prestige, regional leadership, and security.209   
Existing theories of deterrence are based on the rationality of the parties involved; 
therefore, if Iran is not a rational actor in the classical sense, then existing theories will 
not provide an accurate framework from which to develop courses of action in dealing 
with them. There has been tremendous debate within both the scholarly and policy 
making communities’ regarding Iran’s perceived efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and 
the possible ramifications of such a move.  While Iran has a history of provocative action 
and confrontation with the West, their acquisition of nuclear technologies (civil or 
military) can be explained in terms of normal state behavior based on the assumption that 
Iran is a rational actor and a new multi-polar world order is emerging.  Since both Iranian 
foreign and domestic policy demonstrates a balance of pragmatism and idealism 
supporting the conclusion that they are rational actors, then their reasons for pursuing 
nuclear weapons capability can be understood. 
The debate about pragmatism and rationality in Iranian foreign policy was 
explored in order to help develop this consideration.  From Iran’s perspective, nuclear 
weapons may provide protection from regional and global forces that exert pressure to 
constrain their actions.  Such pressures likely include Iran’s encirclement by the U.S., the 
Israeli nuclear weapons program, the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, domestic 
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motivations, and the growing notion that to be a great power, a state must possess nuclear 
weapons.210  Iran has been forced to endure both international sanctions and threats of 
attack since 1979: keeping this in mind, it is logical for them to seek an effective means 
of increasing their state security and international standing through nuclear technology.  
Since Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons capabilities are easily understood in 
terms of countering real or perceived threats to the state, increasing state prominence in 
the international community, and attainment of hegemonic power in the Middle East, 
then they are truly rational actors, thus historical and theoretical models can be applied to 
assess their potential threat to the U.S.  Even the incendiary rhetoric common from 
Iranian President Ahmadinejad is motivated by a shrewd political motivation: it is a 
direct appeal to the sentiments common on the Arab street.  Such appeals establish Iran as 
the leading defender of Islam against the forces of the West and thereby inhibit the ability 
of Sunni rivals to take action against Iran for fear of reprisal from their own 
populations.211 
The appearance that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons does not mean that it has a 
specific intent to employ such weapons immediately, nor does it necessarily mean that a 
future transfer of such weapons to terrorists is imminent.  Direct use of a nuclear weapon 
against the continental U.S.; against American military forces in the Middle East, Europe, 
and Asia; or against U.S. allies in the region or around the globe is not a likely course of 
action for Iran.  This is the case because there is a very high probability that they would 
face a debilitating counter-strike.  Models of deterrence exist to contain direct and 
indirect usage of nuclear weapons, but if Iranian motivations differ from those of 
historical actors, then previous understanding about the rules of nuclear brinksmanship 
may not apply.  This raises the final problem addressed in the thesis: can Iran be deterred 
from using nuclear weapons?  Since Iran appears to be a rational actor in its pursuit of a 
nuclear weapons program, then Cold War models, augmented by contemporary studies 
directed toward specifically toward Iran, provide a framework for an Iranian deterrence 
strategy.  In evaluating the possibility of Iranian direct use of nuclear weapons, a review 
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of the historical model of the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War provided a 
compelling case why Iran can likely be deterred from employing such weapons in a direct 
manner.  The Soviet-American relationship during the Cold War is very similar to the 
U.S.-Iranian relationship today, but despite Soviet-American animosity toward one 
another, numerous opportunities for conflict, and extreme divergence of ideology, there 
was never a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union: the same will 
likely be the case between the U.S. and Iran.  For Iran, the purpose of nuclear weapons is 
clearly deterrence against coercion by rival states and increased state security: they are 
not an offensive military option. 
Iran is not likely to pass nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations for mainly the 
same reasons they are not likely to employ them in a direct manner.  Iran’s motivations 
and rationality will prevent such a reckless policy from being employed. 
Iran’s rationality may also be the reason why thus far it has not shared 
chemical or biological weapons with any of its Arab proxies such as 
Hezbollah, and why a nuclear Iran likely would not share nuclear weapons 
with terrorist groups.212 
Iran desires to be a player on the regional stage: passing nuclear weapons to terrorists 
would lead to international ostracism and run contrary to Iran’s goals as a rising power.  
Iranian rationality would also lead to a cost/benefit analysis resulting in the conclusion 
that such a move would be just as dangerous as a direct attack with nuclear weapons.  As 
stated in Chapter V, states that facilitate international terrorism are responsible for the 
actions of their intermediaries. Iran would pay a price for such actions that would be 
completely contrary to its objectives.213  Nuclear forensics techniques and intelligence 
operations make it possible, though not absolutely certain, that the device would be 
traced back to its origins, thereby enabling retaliatory action.214  Due to questions about 
the reliability of their proxies, threats of retaliation, and reasonable alternatives to WMD, 
Iranian support for nuclear terrorism is neither a likely nor rational possibility in pursuit 
of its national interests. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
With all of this in mind, a reasonable policy recommendation for the U.S. to 
consider is to allow Iran to pursue nuclear technology up to and including nuclear 
weapons.  “Sometimes diplomacy is no substitute for force,” according to Zachary Shore, 
but military action in this case should not be necessary.215  Many Iranians feel that there 
is a way ahead that involves a reciprocal relationship of respect and recognition between 
the U.S. and Iran.  One such Iranian is Ali Larjani, a noted Iranian politician and 
philosopher, who states that: 
[Iran] has a right to nuclear technology … [but] a country’s survival 
depends on its political and diplomatic ties.  You can’t live isolation … the 
government must pursue the national demand for nuclear technology, but 
must make use of diplomatic tools as well … [Larjani] still believes such 
controversial issues can be resolved within the context of negotiations … 
[but] everything depends on the way [the Iranians] are treated.216 
In line with the International Crisis Group’s thinking, the U.S. should respect 
Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, respect the Islamic regime, acknowledge Iran’s 
regional role, and use the current nuclear issue as a test case for future relations between 
the U.S. and Iran.217  This would create a situation in which both Waltz’s theory of 
stability through nuclear weapons would be applied in the real world and we could see 
“the start of a long-term dialog that minimizes risks of confrontation and advances areas 
of mutual interest.”218  This would shift the military balance of power in the Middle East 
away from Israel, thus creating an unaccustomed position for Israel and possibly 
unsettling the nerves of America’s Sunni allies in the region, but would put the U.S. in a 
more balanced position within the region.  After all, as Trita Parsi says:  
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Washington has sought to establish an order that contradicts the natural 
balance by seeking to contain and isolate Iran, one of the most powerful 
countries of the region.219 
This does however present the risk of an arms race in the Middle East.  Countries such as 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt may be tempted to undertake nuclear weapons programs of their 
own to ensure their security as a result of the Shi’a-Sunni and “Persian-Arab” divides 
between Iran and its neighbors.220  This risk is present if Iran develops nuclear weapons 
with or without U.S. acquiescence, therefore it would be in the U.S.’ best interests to act 
based on a worst-case scenario approach.  U.S. involvement right now might also 
persuade them to forgo their own nuclear ambitions in exchange for the extension of a 
strategic nuclear umbrella from the U.S. 
Since Iran is likely pursuing nuclear weapons in order to establish a deterrent 
against aggression from hostile international or regional players, a reasonable way-ahead 
is to offer them some degree of security in order to decrease their perceived need for 
nuclear weapons.  The likely red lines for Iran’s employment of nuclear weapons 
primarily involve either retaliation for a nuclear first strike and external efforts toward 
removal of the current regime.  For these reasons, all negotiations with Iran on the 
nuclear issue should include both an articulation of the U.S. policy of not being the first 
to use nuclear weapons in a conflict and consideration of Iranian resentment for previous 
Western actions against Iran’s governments.221 
Additionally, there are benefits that could be reaped from U.S. acceptance of a 
nuclear-armed Iran, and that would be the creation of an alliance between the two states.  
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Washington has much to gain by Iranian cooperation in its two Middle 
Eastern battlefields, Iraq and Afghanistan—and as much to lose by Iranian 
hostility…There is also an apparent convergence of interests on important 
regional questions—Iraq’s territorial integrity and stability; keeping the 
Taliban at bay in Afghanistan; stopping the flow of narcotics across the 
Afghan border.222 
U.S. acknowledgement of Iran’s regional leadership position, rising power status, and 
right to nuclear weapons would be a big step toward normalization between the countries.  
Mutually beneficial economic and political ties could be created between the two in order 
to decrease America dependence on its current oil providing partners, keep China at bay 
in the Middle East,223 an additional partner in the Islamic world, as well as a potential 
counter-balance to Israeli power in the region and a willing partner in the Arab-Israeli 
peace process. 
Would such an alliance be popular within Iranian borders?  It very likely would 
be: 
According to most polling and anecdotal evidence, the vast majority of 
Iranians are not hostile to the U.S. and, for some time, have been eager for 
dialog and the restoration of normal ties.224 
Such a move on the part of the U.S. would decrease international tensions, provide the 
Iranian regime with a sense of security it has lacked for thirty years, potentially restart the 
Middle East peace process, and open both the U.S. and Iran up for increased economic, 
military, and cultural cooperation.  Conversely, continuation of the present course of 
action could reinforce anti-American sentiment among the Iranian people and drive them 
toward continued support of the current Iranian regime.  As noted by the International 
Crisis Group, “the greater tensions are with Washington, the easier it is for the regime to 
rally supporters, suppress dissent and invoke national unity against a common enemy.”225 
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